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iAbstract
I contrast naturally occurring conversation with the Liturgy of the Catholic Mass, 
focussing on speech acts, implicatures, the intersubjective/argumentative nature of 
language, and on uncooperative communication. This comparison allows me to 
determine what the characteristics of Mass are as an activity type (Levinson 
1992), and to reflect from a Wittgensteinian point of view on the philosophical 
implications of the results gained. Ultimately, I show that human communication 
with the divine, i.e. prayer, closely resembles interpersonal communication in the 
ethical realm.
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‘How are we taught the word “God” (its use, that is)? I cannot give a full 
grammatical description of it. But I can, as it were, make some contributions to 
such a description; I can say a good deal about it and perhaps in time assemble a 
sort of collection of examples.’ 
A diary entry by Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1949 (1984: 82)

1Introduction: ‘Don’t think, but look!’
In the following pages, I will prove that faith in God in many respects is not very 
different from faith in other people, that confessions in prayer are strongly akin to 
the apologies we make to our fellow humans, and that hope for divine mercy is 
really not that different from our natural longing for human forgiveness. 
Furthermore, I will illustrate that where these matters do differ, they give us a 
refreshing look into the purpose of religious beliefs and practices. To do all this, I 
will take a linguistic-pragmatic approach to the Liturgy of the Roman Catholic 
Mass, based on the assumption that if pragmatics tells us how we do things with 
words, a pragmatic study of the Liturgy will tell us how we do things with the 
Word.  
I will start from the idea that ordinary, everyday conversation is the ‘natural 
habitat’ of language, and that liturgical language is a deviation from the default 
situation. By describing both, I will show where and how liturgical language 
deviates from ordinary language, thus laying bare, as it were, the function Mass 
performs in the everyday lives of believers. Put differently, I will determine what 
the characteristics of Mass as an ‘activity type’ are. 
Some elucidation is in order here. We know since Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations that human linguistic communication crystallizes 
into all sorts of different language-games. As is typical of him, Wittgenstein 
refuses to give a definition of what a ‘language-game’ is, but simply states that 
‘the question of “What is a word really?” is analogous to “What is a piece in 
chess?”’ (1953: §108). If we wish to know what a word means, we must not look 
at what it refers to, but at how we use it. ‘Our talk gets its meaning from the rest 
of our activities’ (1975: §229), and in order to see clearly what it means, we have 
to take the activities in which we talk into account as well, as one word may have 
as many meanings as uses. More recently, Levinson coined the term ‘activity 
type’ (which is roughly analogous to ‘language-game’), to describe how our 
activities ‘constrain what will count as an allowable contribution to each 
[linguistic] activity [and] help to determine how what one says will be “taken”’ 
(1992: 97). The ‘paradigm examples’ given by Levinson are ‘teaching, a job 
interview, a jural interrogation, a football game (…), a dinner party, and so on’. 
He locates each type along ‘a gradient formed by two polar types, the totally 
prepackaged activity, on the one hand (e.g. a Roman Mass) and the largely 
unscripted event on the other (e.g. a chance meeting on the street)’ (ibid.: 69-70).
In the first two chapters of this paper, I will compare precisely these two polar 
types. As said, I will regard naturally occurring conversation, such as a chance 
meeting, as the default form of human linguistic communication. We talk a lot – 
‘on average perhaps 16.000 words and 1200 turns at talk a day’ (Levinson 2016: 
26) – mostly in spontaneous, unscripted interactions. These can be categorized into 
all sorts of ‘games’ or activities, as shown by Wittgenstein and Levinson, but in 
this paper I take their shared features to distinguish them as a single overarching 
category of everyday conversation. The Liturgy, on the contrary, is a text, and as 
such Mass is indeed scripted in advance. This feature is a fundamental deviation 
from the standard use of language, one that must have a use of its own. There will 
be more of such telling differences, which I will line up and describe at the end of 
chapter 2. The past six or seven decades have seen the emergence of many 
linguistic-pragmatic theories on why everyday conversation is what it is. I will 
dedicate chapter 1 to a chronological overview of some of these theories, in order 
to lay bare five aspects of conversation. These aspects will function as a 
background in chapter 2 against which we can hold the Liturgy. Such a 
comparison will allow us to see where the Liturgy and ordinary conversation 
diverge, and what it is we do in Mass that we do not do in everyday talk. 
Let me explain the relevance of such an investigation. The last couple of 
decades have seen a number of interesting biological, psychological and cognitive 
accounts of religious belief (Boyer 2001, Dawkins 2006, Dennett 2006, Hitchens 
2007), most of which are critical, to put it mildly. These publications are 
doubtlessly necessary in the 21st century. Considering the evident dangers of 
modern religious fundamentalism and the long history and actuality of religious 
warfare, we will have to agree with Dennett that we ‘can think of no more 
important topic to investigate’ (2006: 7).  
Nevertheless, it has always been my modest though firm conviction that these 
scientific explanations of religion are in at least one way completely besides the 
point: they treat religious behaviour as being grounded on false beliefs, whereas it 
may, as I will show in this paper, be primarily rooted in interpersonal relations 
between people (i.e. ethics, for lack of a better term) and the passions involved in 
such relations – which have nothing to do with epistemological beliefs in any 
primary sense. More specifically, these critical theories try to show that religion is 
flawed by proving that God is non-existent and even a ‘delusion’, while, as we 
will see, belief in and assertion of the existence of (the omnipotence of) God are 
not as central to religion as these theories assume. Thus, my view is opposed to 
scientism, and is basically in line firstly with fideism, the epistemological notion 
that religious belief is a sui generis phenomenon that cannot be reduced to other 
rational processes (James 1982), and secondly with functionalism, the 
anthropological view that religious behaviour needs not be explained through 
other types of behaviour (Radcliffe-Brown 1952).
As said, the present paper is a linguistic-pragmatic approach to Mass as a 
religious phenomena. One reason for this is that I found my own view most 
clearly reflected in the writings of a philosopher of both language and religion, 
3who has been associated both with fideism (Nielsen 1967) and functionalism 
(Clack 1996), namely Ludwig Wittgenstein. We will deal with Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy in more depth in the third chapter. However, to illustrate the main 
purposes of this paper it is necessary to turn briefly to his Remarks on Frazer’s 
Golden Bough.
James Frazer’s The Golden Bough (1890), a famous landmark of Victorian 
study in mythology and religion, aims to show how mankind allegedly progressed 
from magical practices through religious rituals to scientific investigation. 
Wittgenstein criticizes Frazer for having a ‘narrow spiritual life’ (Wittgenstein 
1993: 125) and for being ‘much more a savage than most of his savages, for (…) 
his explanations of primitive practices are much more crude than the meaning of 
these practices themselves’ (ibid.: 131). Frazer makes the magical and religious 
views of mankind ‘look like errors’, i.e. as bad hypotheses, faulty science, to 
which Wittgenstein famously replies: ‘Was Augustine in error, then, when he 
called upon God on every page of the Confessions? (…) The very idea of wanting 
to explain a practice seems wrong’, because ‘compared with the impression which 
the thing described makes on us, the explanation is too uncertain’. Instead of 
striving to come up with a rational explanation for religious and ritualistic 
behaviour, ‘here one can only describe and say: this is what human life is like’ 
(ibid.: 119-123). It is important to note that such a refusal to provide explanations 
is a good example of how Wittgenstein deals with philosophical problems in 
general. His basic method of investigation is a strict critique of ‘a mode of 
questioning that perhaps first came to explicit expression in Socratic questions 
such as “What is piety?” and “What is justice?”’ (Franks 2006: 26). As 
philosophically challenging as such questions may seem, they are ‘wrong’ in that 
they take words and concepts that make perfect sense within the context of a 
particular language-game out of that context, to subject them to an ‘investigation 
of essence’ (ibid.: 27). In the words of Wittgenstein:
‘When philosophers use a word – “knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, 
“proposition”, “name” – and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one 
must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the 
language-game which is its original home? – What we do is to bring 
words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use’ (1953: §116).
If we want to know what the meanings of words are, or the essence of the things 
they refer to, we should not think of the words as entities with one reference, but 
as ‘tools in a tool-box’ (ibid.: §11) that may serve many purposes. For those who 
wish to know what uses our words have, Wittgenstein has a piece of advice that is 
4once again typical of his lifelong adherence to the principle of simplex sigillum 
veri: ‘Don’t think, but look!’ (ibid.: §66). 
The purpose of the present paper, then, is twofold: first, in chapter 1 and 2 we 
work towards a description of Mass as an activity type, second, in chapter 3 we 
use this description as an overview in order to determine how some of the 
liturgical keywords, such as ‘God’, are being used within the language-game of 
Mass. The main question, therefore, can be formulated as follows: how does the 
language use in the Catholic Mass differ from naturally occurring conversation, 
and what do the differences tell us with regards to the pragmatics of religious 
language, and the use of some of the keywords of the Liturgy? In sum, my aims 
are:
(1) to show in chapter 1 the complexities involved in everyday 
conversation, by paying attention to different (conversational) speech 
acts, implicatures, the intersubjective/argumentative nature of 
language, and to uncooperative communication,
(2) to contrast these complexities in chapter 2 with the language of the 
Liturgy, by applying the same theories to the Catholic Mass, 
determining as such what the characteristics of Mass are as an 
activity type, 
(3) and to reflect in chapter 3 on the philosophical entailments of our 
results, with regards to fundamental issues such as the reality of God 
or the nature of salvation, by looking at how liturgical keywords 
related to such issues are being used in Mass.
This structure reflects our purposes: the first chapter will serve as a background 
for the second chapter, and both will in turn serve as a background for chapter 3. 
Ultimately, I will contend that Mass functions primarily at the interpersonal level, 
within the ethical domain of responsibility, guilt and forgiveness, and that as such 
the ritual closely resembles simple examples of everyday interaction between 
people.
To conclude, a bit more on corpus and theory. Why the Catholic Mass, and 
why a linguistic-pragmatic analysis? As for the first question, the main reason is 
simply that I am most familiar with it. However, I also believe that, due to its old 
age and highly eclectic nature (Chidester 2000: 73-78), Mass may serve perfectly 
as an example of any ritual, and that the results of this investigation will in some 
respects be the same for analyses of other liturgical texts or rituals. Therefore, the 
word ‘prayer’ in the title of this work should be seen as a broad term, referring to 
human communication with the divine in general, in both social and personal 
contexts. As for the second question, there are a number of reasons to opt for a 
5linguistic-pragmatic analysis. As mentioned above, a pragmatic analysis of the 
Liturgy will tell us what people do in Mass, as opposed to what they say. 
Secondly, numerous scholars have applied linguistic pragmatics (especially 
Speech Act Theory) to religious language before, but more recent developments 
in linguistics (such as on the notion of intersubjectivity) have been applied to this 
subject only rarely (Hilborn 1995: 430). Thirdly, since our comparison will not 
only point out where the Liturgy and ordinary language diverge, but also where 
they overlap, I believe our results will tell us something about language in general 
as well. Especially in the third chapter, we will see that our investigation may 
shed its light in two directions. Consequently, this paper is as much about 
language as it is about religion. 
61.
The complexities of conversation
There is a growing consensus among linguists nowadays, that ‘spontaneous 
dialogue between two or more people’, should be regarded as the ‘fundamental 
site for language use’ (Clark 1996: 318). Everyday conversation is ‘the core 
ecological niche for language, and still its primary use and the locus of its 
acquisition’ (Levinson 2016: 6). Basic human linguistic communication is a ‘turn-
taking’ process (Schlegoff 2007), in that it naturally involves a speaker saying 
something to a hearer, with the latter taking over the role of the former and saying 
something back. Tomasello argues that human language actually grew on top of a 
pre-linguistic ‘highly complex, species-unique, psychological infrastructure of 
shared intentionality’ (2008: 60) and ‘as part of a broader adaption for 
collaborative activity and cultural life in general’ (ibid.: 324). In other words, 
language must have emerged initially in teleological interaction, and kept on 
developing mainly there for perhaps thousands of years. Even the syntactic 
structures of language, including a phenomenon such as recursion, may have 
emerged from and may still get shaped by dialogue (Levinson 2013, Du Bois 
2014). Even more strikingly, recent research has shown that the conversational 
model may actually underlie not only language but even human cognition in 
general (Pascual 2014). Socrates seems to have been thinking in the right 
direction, when in Plato’s Theaetetus he described thought as a ‘conversation of 
the soul’. 
Then again, in its current shape this idea is not even a century old. The main 
idea had always been that language is fundamentally a means of exchanging 
information (Verhagen 2004: 9). Philosophers of language were primarily 
interested in what happens when a speaker says something to a hearer, and under 
what circumstances such utterances were true or false. This approach found its 
epitome in Logical Positivism, with as its major promoters philosophers such as 
Frege, Russell, the early Wittgenstein, and Ayers. It was not until Austin, among 
others, reacted against Logical Positivism, starting a line of thought that was later 
dubbed ‘Ordinary Language Philosophy’, that philosophers of language started 
paying attention to the way people use ordinary language in everyday situations. 
As things stand now, the pragmatic dimension turns out to be much more 
important for the semantic, grammatical and even syntactical ones than thought – 
or at least the latter three cannot be fully understood without taking the former 
into account (Verhagen 2005, Tomasello 2008, DuBois 2014). The purpose of this 
chapter is to sketch the complexities involved in conversation. In order to do this, 
we will give a brief chronological overview of some of the more important 
7philosophical and linguistic theories of ordinary language that emerged 
throughout the 20th and 21st century. 
1.1 Speech acts
In 1955, J.L. Austin gave twelve lectures at Harvard University, which were 
published posthumously in a collection titled How To Do Things With Words 
(1962).1 In these lectures, Austin reacted against the logical positivist standpoint 
that a proposition could only be meaningful if its truth can be verified. Such a 
view unrightfully discarded ordinary language as unimportant, focussing solely on 
non-natural languages such as logic, mathematics and scientific discourse. For 
Austin, this was a mistake, since ordinary language had to be ordinary for a 
reason, i.e. had to be correct or at least functional in its own right. Also, Logical 
Positivism overlooked the fact that language is not only used to describe the 
world, but also to act in the world (Chapman 2011: 50). 
Austin developed his theory throughout the twelve lectures, ending up in a 
different place than where he started from. First of all, he gave a number of 
examples of sentences that allow speakers to do things, instead of merely say 
something:
(1) I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth.
(2) I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.
(3) I give and bequeath my watch to my brother.
(Austin 1962: 5)
In each of these examples, the speaker performs an act (christening a ship, betting 
with somebody, giving away something in a will) by uttering a sentence. Instead 
of describing a state of affairs, these performative sentences constitute a state of 
affairs. Whereas the examples in (1)-(3) may not seem so ordinary after all, there 
are other examples of performative utterances that are used by speakers on a more 
daily basis, such as ‘I apologize’, ‘I object’, or ‘I give my word’ (Levinson 1983: 
228).
Probably the most important of Austin’s insights is his distinction between 
three types of force that all utterances have, and that allow speakers to perform 
three kinds of acts:
1 I will in some cases refer to Levinson’s Pragmatics (1983), in addition to the primary works of 
the authors who we will be discussing, due to the efficiency of Levinson’s examples.
8(i)  locutionary act: the utterance of a sentence with determinate sense 
and reference
(ii) illocutionary act: the making of a statement, offer, promise etc. in 
uttering a sentence (…)
(iii) perlocutionary act: the bringing about of effects on the audience by 
means of uttering the sentence (…)
(Levinson 1983: 236)
To give just one example: when someone says ‘It’s freezing in here!’ to another 
person sitting by the open window, this performs (i) the locutionary act of saying 
something, (ii) the illocutionary act of directing someone to closing the window 
and (iii) the perlocutionary act of getting someone to close the window (and/or 
annoying someone by bossing them around etc.) From such observations, it 
becomes very clear why Austin was right in attacking logical positivist thinkers 
for their obsession with language as a tool for description. Even such a simple 
sentence as ‘It’s freezing in here!’ conveys different kinds of meaning that have 
nothing to do with truth or falsity, but that help people communicate in ways that 
are fundamental for everyday interaction.
Austin’s theory was in many respects perfected by J.R. Searle, who coined the 
term ‘speech acts’. What the term refers to for Searle coincides mostly with 
Austin’s notion of ‘illocutionary act’, meaning the act a speaker performs in 
saying something. Searle distinguished between five basic illocutionary acts (see 
table 1 on the next page). We will briefly explain the criteria in the three rightmost 
columns. The illocutionary point of an utterance is the function it performs in a 
communicative interaction. For example, a request and a command have the same 
point, namely to get somebody to do something (Searle 1976: 3), and as such they 
are directive acts. The direction of fit of an utterance means whether its 
propositional content aims to match a state of affairs in the world (words-to-
world, as with representatives, e.g. ‘The earth revolves around the sun’), or 
whether it tries to change (a state of affairs in) the world (world-to-words, as with 
directives and commissives, e.g. ‘Close the window!’ or ‘I’ll pick you up at five’). 
Expressives have no direction of fit, because ‘the truth of the expressed 
proposition is presupposed’ (ibid.: 12). Declarations correspond to Austin’s 
performatives, in that they establish facts in the world. This means they have both 
directions of fit, in that they make something to be the case, which is the case if 
and only if these required words are uttered. The sincerity condition, finally, is 
‘the psychological act expressed in the performance of the illocutionary act’ 
(ibid.: 4). When a person asserts that p, he therein expresses the belief that p, and 
when he requests someone to do p, he expresses the desire that the other person 
does p.
9Table 1: an overview of illocutionary acts (Searle 1976, Levinson 
1983: 240)
These are the basic things we do with words. Crucially, Searle concluded his 
investigation by saying that ‘often, we do more than one of these at once in the 
same utterance’ (ibid.: 22-23). For example, if someone utters the expressive 
‘Brrrr!’, this may well be at once an expressive (‘I’m cold’), a representative (‘It’s 
cold in here’) and a directive (‘Close the window’). In this case, the expressive is 
a direct speech act, and the representative and directive are indirect speech acts 
(Levinson 1983: 263). The crucial point of Speech Act Theory (SAT) is that 
speakers in even the most ordinary interactions are not so much merely 
exchanging information by saying things, but are constantly performing actions in 
saying things, with the actions performed often outnumbering the things explicitly 
said. Everyday conversation as such is a highly complex form of ‘joint action’ 
(Levinson 2016: 1). In the next paragraph, we will discuss how Conversation 
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Analysis further developed SAT, by proving that there is an even higher density 
of speech acts to be found in excerpts of simple conversations.
1.2 Speech acts in Conversation Analysis
As revolutionary as SAT may seem, ‘research (…) boomed for little over a decade 
(in the 1970s and 1980s), and then went out of fashion’ (Levinson 2016: 2). 
However, in Conversation Analysis, a number of interesting observations have 
been made that seem to prove that Searle’s classification is not exhaustive. 
Conversation Analysis (CA) broke away from the sociological school of 
ethnomethodology in the 1970s, as an attempt to do away with ‘unmotivated 
theoretical constructs and unsubstantiated intuition’ (Levinson 1983: 295). 
Conversation analysts aim merely to transcribe real-life conversations, focussing 
on the bare structural patterns in the data. The results have proven to be 
surprising, to say the least: conversations are richly structured, showing dozens of 
complex and recurring patterns. CA’s main critique of SAT is that it ‘inherited 
from traditional philosophy the single act or utterance as its fundamental unit’ and 
overlooks ‘the sequential infrastructure of talk-in-interaction’ (Schlegoff 1988: 
61). Austin and Searle based their classifications on ‘arm-chair’ examples, not on 
actual recorded data of naturally occurring conversations. Because of that, they 
overlooked a number of crucial features of real-life talk, such as its interactional 
structure of ‘adjacency pairing’ and all sorts of purely conversational acts. 
An adjacency pair consists of an initiation and a response, such as greeting-
greeting, offer-acceptance, question-answer. One pair is ‘composed of two turns 
by different speakers, [which are] adjacently placed (…) [and which] are 
relatively ordered into first pair parts and second pair parts’ (Schlegoff 2007: 13). 
Here is a simple example:
(4) A: Would you like a cup of coffee? (First Pair Part)
B: No, thanks. (Second Pair Part)
One important aspect of adjacency pairs is that second pair parts can be used to 
identify first pair parts. Consider the following example:
(5) A: She says you might want that dress I bought, I don’t know 
     whether you do.
B: Oh thanks, well, let me see I really have lots of dresses.
(Levinson 2016: 8)
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It is only from the thanks in B that we learn that A was an offer, because there 
was nothing in A that indicated this. Levinson calls this thanks a speech act, 
because ‘this is how we check that we are understood – we expect a response of a 
certain type’ (ibid.).
Adjacency pairs can be expanded in three positions:
← Pre-expansion
A First Pair Part
← Insert expansion
B Second Pair Part
← Post-expansion
(Schlegoff 2007: 26)
Within these expansions, speakers often perform actions that are purely 
conversational, such as pre-invitations, go-aheads and repair-initiators. We will 
look at these three examples. 
An example of a pre-expansion is a pre-invitation, such as ‘Are you doing 
anything tonight?’, which is ‘ordinarily understood (…) as a preliminary to a 
possible invitation’ (ibid.: 30) and not as a request for information. Other 
examples of pre-expansions are pre-offers and pre-announcements. 
An example of a go-ahead is ‘what’ in the following conversation: 
(6) A: Did you hear the terrible news?  
B: No. What.
(Levinson 2016: 11)
As Levinson points out, ‘describing [A] as a question would miss its basic 
function, namely to check whether a news announcement should be made; line 
[B] makes clear it should’ (ibid.). The ‘what’ in B tells the speaker of A to ‘go-
ahead’ and announce the news. 
A basic example of a repair-initiator is when someone says ‘Excuse me?’ 
because he or she could not make out what another person was saying.   
It is important to note that the different expansions within adjacency pairs can 
be adjacency pairs themselves, and that insert expansions can have insert 
expansions, so that first and second pair parts get separated by other pairs. This 
centre embedding of adjacency pairs gives conversation a recursive structure (see 
Levinson 2013 for examples of such ‘pragmatic embedding’). 
Here is a fictional example of an ordinary conversation through the lens of 
CA:
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Table 2: a fictive conversation containing an adjacency pair with pre-, 
insert- and post-expansions
Notice how in the left column there are five questions in a row, which in Searle’s 
account would perform roughly the same act, whereas in the right column we see 
that for CA each of these questions performs a different conversational act. The 
core issue here is that ‘all speech acts are necessarily interactional in character’ 
(Levinson 2016: 9). Whereas Searle’s theory provided us with an overview of the 
five basic actions interlocutors may perform in hypothetical situations, CA shows 
that actual interlocutors in spontaneous conversation perform all sorts of purely 
procedural actions as well. 
1.3 Conversational implicatures
As we have seen, SAT explained how speakers may perform multiple actions in 
one utterance. Another way to talk about this is to say that speakers sometimes 
mean something different than what they say. So when I say ‘It’s freezing in 
here!’, and you close the window, this can only happen if you grasp right away 
that my words convey some sort of pragmatic meaning along with their semantic 
content. In 1975, H.P Grice published an article called ‘Logic and Conversation’, 
which aimed to describe ‘the nature and importance of the conditions governing 
conversation’ (1975: 43). Grice focussed on the difference between two levels of 
meaning, namely what is said and what is implicated (ibid.: 58). The reason that 
hearers are able to grasp implicated meanings that are wholly absent from the 
explicit content, is that they always assume the speaker to adhere to what Grice 
dubbed the Cooperative Principle: 
Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in 
which you are engaged (ibid.: 45).
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Speakers are at all time expected to be cooperative, so that any utterance has to 
convey at least some relevant meaning. Deviations from the principle carry 
meaning in themselves, and these are what Grice calls implicatures. He goes on to 
distinguish four maxims and submaxims, which function as ‘guidelines for the 
efficient and effective use of language in conversation’ (Levinson 1983: 101):
Table 3: Grice’s four basic maxims of conversation (ibid.: 45-46)
These maxims are the reason why conversation, and more generally human 
communication, is a coherent and successful affair nine times out of ten. 
Participants in a conversation assume that the other is loyal to the cooperative 
principle, hence to the maxims in table 3, and most of the time rightly so. 
Whenever one participant says something that at first sight seems uncooperative, 
or ‘besides the point’, the meaning of that utterance must be somewhere else than 
in the words. Flouting or violating one or more of the maxims adds extra layers of 
meaning to explicit content. For example, when ‘at a genteel tea party, A says 
Mrs. X is an old bag (…) and then B says The weather has been quite delightful 
this summer, hasn’t it?, B has blatantly refused to make what he says relevant to 
A’s preceding remark (i.e. B has openly flouted the maxim of Relevance, TZ) 
[and] thereby implicates that A’s remark should not be discussed, and, perhaps 
more specifically, that A has committed a social gaffe’ (Grice 1975: 54).  
Another interesting aspect of (some) implicatures is that they are cancellable, 
which allows for a strategic type of language use. Here is a good example by 
Pinker (2007: 394): when I get pulled over by a police officer for speeding, and I 
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say to him: ‘Maybe the best thing would be to take care of it here’, he may 
righteously infer that I flouted the first maxim of Quantity (and/or the second 
maxim of Manner) by omitting from my utterance the more explicit suggestion of 
bribery. Now, if the officer were honest and would wish to arrest me for bribery, I 
could simply cancel the implicature and say that it was not what I meant at all.
Grice showed that language contains a whole dimension of implicit meanings, 
communicated through subtle or blatant manipulations of conversational maxims. 
The underlying mechanism that makes this possible is the cooperative principle, 
i.e. the mutual assumption of speaker and hearer that they are participating in a 
joint activity, and that they act accordingly. In the next paragraph, we will discuss 
how this notion of cooperation has been developed further.
1.4 Intersubjectivity and argumentativity
One thing that sets humans apart from virtually the entire animal kingdom, is ‘our 
ability to ‘take another’s perspective’’ (Verhagen 2005: 2). This ability forms a 
foundation for the ‘fundamentally cooperative nature of human communication’ 
(Tomasello 2008: 6). Because human beings are able to see others as intentional 
agents like themselves, they are remarkably good at detecting intentions in the 
behaviour of conspecifics (i.e. recognizing the illocutionary points and sincerity 
conditions in the communicational behaviour of others). This is why humans are 
capable of communicating by pointing and pantomiming, as well as by other 
forms of body language, such as direction of gaze or facial expression: although 
the communicative signal may be extremely simple – e.g. a pointing index finger 
– the cooperative principle makes it transparent for both sender and receiver that 
something is meant with the gesture (e.g. ‘Look at that!’). Cooperation-
experiments with chimpanzees and human children, involving such basic 
communicative signals as pointing, have led Tomasello to conclude that: 
‘[h]uman cooperative communication is more complex than ape 
intentional communication because its underlying social-cognitive 
infrastructure comprises not only skills for understanding individual 
intentionality but also skills and motivations for shared intentionality’ 
(2008: 321).
Now, as Verhagen points out, if human communication is fundamentally a joint 
activity ‘then we should also expect that it has repercussions for the content that is 
systematically coded in linguistic symbols (words and constructions)’ (2005: 4). If 
language has emerged and developed further over time mainly in interactional 
settings, words and constructions should display a fundamental intersubjectivity, 
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Figure 2: The intersubjective construal configuration (ibid: 7)
rather than subjectivity. We will explain these terms briefly, showing how the 
roles they play differ in terms of construal.
The term subjectivity refers to a twofold complex: on the one hand it means 
that ‘the conceptualization by a subject is distinguished from the ‘object’ of 
conceptualization (…), [o]n the other hand it means that the choice for words and 
constructions is often ‘personal’, ‘not shared’’ (ibid.: 4-5). Langacker points out, 
as quoted by Verhagen, that ‘the relationship between a speaker (or hearer) and a 
situation that he conceptualizes and portrays, involve[s] focal adjustments and 
imagery’ (ibid.). This relationship is what Langacker calls construal, and it is 
because of this that whenever we represent a state of affairs by speaking about it, 
we inherently represent, or construe it in some way as opposed to other possible 
ways (e.g. active/passive, word order, temporal aspect etc.). 
Figure 1: The subjective construal configuration (ibid: 5)
Figure 1 is a schematic representation of this relation. The speaker is represented 
by the V (viewer), the construed state of affairs by the top-circles. The vertical 
line corresponds to the construal relation between subject and object, which 
determines the configuration of the represented state of affairs.
Intersubjectivity is in nearly all respects the same as subjectivity, except that it 
incorporates the cooperative nature of language, and recognizes the fact that 
speakers in the vast majority of cases construe a linguistic signal while taking the 
hearer into account. Verhagen represents this relation as in figure 2:
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In this view, 
‘[t]he point of a linguistic utterance, in broad terms, is that the first 
conceptualizer invites the second to jointly attend to an object of 
conceptualization in some specific way, and to update the common ground 
by doing so’ (ibid.).
The notion of ‘common ground’ (Clark 1996) will be crucial later, so I will 
expand on it for a moment here. To interpret a speaker’s utterance it is not enough 
to know what it refers to. We must also ‘be able to determine: what is [the 
speaker’s] intention in directing my attention in this way? But to make this 
determination with any confidence requires (…) some kind of joint attention or 
shared experience between us’ (Tomasello 2008: 4). In order to understand what 
somebody wants to achieve with a communicative act, you have to be able to take 
their point of view – which is only possible if you share at least some ‘form of 
life’ (Wittgenstein 1953: §23). In Clark’s words: 
‘Everything we do is rooted in information we have about our 
surroundings, activities, perceptions, emotions, plans, interests. 
Everything we do jointly with others is also rooted in this information, 
but only in that part we think they share with us’ (1996: 92). 
This shared information is what Clark calls ‘common ground’. One important 
dimension of common ground is that two interlocutors do not only share it, they 
also know of each other that they know that they share it. Clark defines this as 
‘common ground (reflexive): p is common ground for members of C if and only 
if: (i) the members of C have information that p and that i’ (ibid.: 95). 
Focussing again on intersubjectivity, there is one major implication of this 
aspect of language. If it is true that interlocutors in conversation regard their 
activity as a joint attempt to reach a certain goal or understanding, and that 
language therefore fundamentally involves a sort of we-intentionality (Searle 
1995), then it may well be true that ‘[human] language is also fundamentally a 
matter of regulating and assessing others, with exchange of information perhaps 
being secondary’ (Verhagen 2005: 9). The word ‘also’ here means ‘as with 
communication in other species’. As Owings and Morton have shown, animal 
communication is built on a dyadic relationship between speaker and hearer 
(Verhagen 2008: 308). In the case of the alarm calls of vervet monkeys, for 
example, which alert conspecifics that a predator is approaching, there seems to 
be no reason to think of these calls as referring to the predator. Instead, the 
meaning of such a call is simply to direct conspecifics, i.e. to instantly change 
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their conduct to a more alert one. Due to the intersubjective nature of human 
communication, it seems that our language may well be such a dyadic system too, 
with built into it, as it were, a referential, triadic system involving a speaker, a 
hearer and an object of joint attention (ibid.). Chimpanzees also use an 
‘intentional structure comprising the communicator’s social intention as his 
fundamental goal, and his “referential” intention as a means to that goal’ 
(Tomasello 2008: 50-51). Projected onto Verhagen’s model of intersubjectivity, 
this view can be clarified by saying that language mainly functions at the 
intersubjective level, as represented by the horizontal line between 1 and 2, and 
that the vertical line (construal) and the upper-horizontal line (the description of a 
state of affairs) are merely means to an end:
     
Figure 3: The fundamental dyadic relation between speaker 
and hearer
One theory that lines up perfectly with this view, is that of argumentativity. 
According to this theory, normal language use is never just informative, but 
always ‘argumentative’, meaning that 
‘the default condition for ordinary expressions (…) is that they provide an 
argument for some conclusion, and this argumentative orientation is what 
is constant in the function of the expression, while its information value is 
more variable’ (Verhagen 2008: 311-312). 
Not only is human language fundamentally an intersubjective affair, it is also 
inherently an argumentative affair. In addition, for the same reasons that 
Verhagen expected the intersubjective nature to surface in linguistic structures 
(construal), he expects this for the argumentative aspect as well. One famous 
example of an utterance that may seem merely informative, but really conveys an 
argumentative meaning, was given by Ducrot and borrowed by Verhagen (2005: 
11): 
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(7) There are seats in this room.
(a) But they are uncomfortable.
(b) # And moreover, they are uncomfortable.
In (7), an argumentative inference would be that there is a certain amount of 
comfort in the room. This shows from the fact that when this inference is 
cancelled, the additive conjunction gives an infelicitous result, as in (7b). 
Therefore, ‘an addressee has to take the utterance of [7] as an attempt by the 
speaker to induce inferences of a specific kind; that is, as an operation in 
dimension S (the intersubjective dimension, TZ) of the construal configuration’ 
(ibid.: 12). 
1.5 Uncooperative communication
Something that may already have become quite clear from the theories mentioned 
above, is that language is an exquisite tool not only for cooperation but also for 
deception, misleading and manipulation. If there is a principle for cooperative 
communication that we can or cannot adhere to, there is, needless to say, also 
such a thing as uncooperative communication. Quite little attention has been paid 
to this dimension of language yet, but recently work has been done to fill the gaps. 
Oswald states that ‘the Gricean framework is unsuited to fully capture a 
phenomenon as complex as deception’ (2010: 100). Of the greatest importance, 
perhaps, is his observation that if language is fundamentally cooperative, in order 
for deception to be successful, there needs to be an underlying level of 
cooperation for deceptive utterances to work. Put simply, if I lie to you by saying 
I did not take the money from your desk, in order for that lie to work and deceive 
you (as an example of uncooperative communication), you need first to 
understand the meaning of my words, grasp my reasons for saying them, 
recognize any possible implicatures etc. – which in the Gricean framework 
requires cooperation. Oswald solves this paradox by distinguishing between three 
types of cooperation. First, communicative cooperation (CC) is a ‘minimal level 
of cooperation’ that functions as a ‘default assumption language users make about 
the ‘upcoming’ and expected meaningfulness of locutions (or verbal 
contributions) in the conversation’ (ibid.: 21). Second, informational cooperation 
(IC) is ‘cooperation in the making, transmission and interpretation of meaning’, 
and as such constructs ‘the actual, dynamic (…) meaning in conversation’ (ibid.: 
27). This is the level of cooperation on which the mechanisms exposed by Searle 
and Grice function. Whereas CC constitutes the ‘mere possibility’ of the 
transmission of meaning, ‘the goal of IC is to ensure that a specific meaning gets 
across’ (ibid.: 29). The top-level is perlocutionary cooperation (PC). As the term 
19
‘perlocutionary’ already suggests (see paragraph 1.1), this level of cooperation is 
concerned with the extra-linguistic goals of interlocutors, i.e. the effects speakers 
wish to bring about with an utterance. 
It is at the top-level that deception comes into play, because ‘we witness in 
everyday conversations, particularly in situations where interests between speaker 
and hearer conflict, that conversational participants do not work jointly towards a 
shared goal’ (ibid.: 32). Therefore, Oswald defines deception as ‘a covert failure 
to PC-cooperate’ (ibid.: 101). When I lie to you about not having stolen your 
money, CC and IC are necessarily successful (for otherwise there could be no 
communication at all); however, because it is my goal to have you believe 
something that is not true, and because you are not aware of that goal, we do not 
cooperate at the perlocutionary level.
We will look at one more striking example of uncooperative communication, 
before moving on to an overview of this chapter. Meibauer describes lying ‘as a 
speech act in which the liar has the intention to deceive the addressee about the 
facts and about their own beliefs’ (2014: ix). He relates how it is possible to lie 
with implicatures, and illustrates this with the Story of the Mate and the Captain 
(ibid.: 123). Suppose a captain and his mate on board of a ship get into a quarrel. 
The captain, who never drinks, accuses the mate of drinking too much. The next 
morning, the mate writes the following entry in the ship’s logbook: ‘Today, 
October 14th, the captain is not drunk’. What is interesting about this example is 
that whereas the mate’s entry in the logbook is true, the implicature it conveys is 
false. In Meibauer’s words: 
‘[A] reader will understand that this is an exception because the captain 
is usually drunk (…). The calculation of the implicature starts from 
assuming a presumptive violation of the maxim of Relevance, for entries 
in logbooks must be relevant’ (ibid.).
There are many more dimensions to Oswald’s and Meibauer’s accounts. For our 
present purposes, however, it is sufficient to take over from their works the crucial 
observation that although human language is fundamentally a cooperative affair, 
this does not mean that it cannot be used uncooperatively.
1.6 Five aspects of conversation
So, why ‘the complexities of conversation’ as the title of this first chapter? What 
is the red line running through each of the theories we discussed in the previous 
paragraphs? Can we point out a number of fundamental aspects of naturally 
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occurring conversation that these theories lay bare? I distinguish five of such 
aspects:
1. Action – It becomes clear from our overview that conversation is a form of 
action. SAT has shown that interlocutors in a conversation may (sometimes 
unconsciously) perform all sorts of acts in speaking, and that these acts need to be 
recognized by hearers in order for speakers to achieve what they intended to do. 
Additionally, CA revealed that speech acts are inherent to the structure of even the 
most basic conversations, and that even at the micro-level of a single adjacency 
pair, the acts performed by an utterance may be crucial for the conversation to 
continue successfully. Furthermore, the argumentative view of language shows 
how seemingly purely descriptive utterances may have an underlying 
argumentative meaning, and that language is a tool primarily for directing others – 
which is of course an act. Finally, it was shown by Oswald and Meibauer that 
uncooperative communication works on the perlocutionary level of cooperation, 
and that lying should be regarded as a speech act.  
2. Cooperation – Conversation is a cooperative process. The acts we perform 
in speaking are often directed at others, and at our collaborative undertakings with 
others. Furthermore, interlocutors in an ongoing conversation take each other’s 
perspectives, which allows them to omit information from utterances, as they 
assume that the other is able to recognize implicatures and to make certain 
inferences. Conversation is a ‘joint activity’, involving the speaker’s assumptions 
and beliefs about the hearer’s assumptions and beliefs (and vice versa), and the 
ability to put such information about each other to use in the process. Even with 
respect to uncooperative communication, cooperation is an aspect of conversation 
that is crucial, since deceiving or misleading someone by using language requires 
at least some level of mutual understanding. 
3. Strategy – I would argue that conversation is more or less (relative to 
different contexts) a strategic affair. SAT and Gricean implicatures have shown 
how speakers can use the discrepancy between the literal content of an utterance 
and its implicatures, to perform multiple (indirect) acts at the same time, or to 
imply things that can later be cancelled. Linguistic manipulations are not only 
useful in situations such as an attempt to bribe a police officer (see paragraph 3.1), 
but serve their function in all sorts of ordinary face-to-face communication as 
well, as described in politeness theory (Chapman 2011: 132), or as can be seen 
with honorifics (Potts 2007).
4. Uncertainty – A simple yet very important observation is that ‘although 
people talk in order to get things done, they don’t know in advance what they will 
actually do’ (Clark 1996: 319). That is, naturally occurring conversation contains 
a great deal of uncertainty, possible confusion and misunderstandings. Some of 
the conversational speech acts observed by CA function exclusively to erase 
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sources of uncertainty, such as repair-initiators and repairs, pre-invitations, pre-
questions and their subsequent go-aheads. Other examples are gist, which ‘allows 
for clearing up any possible misunderstanding in terms of the semantic meaning 
of the language used’ (e.g. ‘Do you mean this Monday or next?’) and upshot, 
which ‘allows for clarification of the pragmatic meaning behind the language 
used’ (e.g. A: ‘I’m cold’, B: ‘You mean you want me to close the window?’) 
(McCabe 2011: 39). Of course, this aspect of conversation follows directly from 
the previous ones. ‘We are creating social action as we interact, and we constantly 
analyze our interlocutors’ conduct as we participate’ (ibid.: 37). It is only natural 
that our analyses of the intentions and strategies of others are sometimes wide of 
the mark, which makes spontaneous conversation a doubtful business.
5. Fluctuation – A final feature of conversation that became apparent from 
this chapter is that it is constantly in flux: the meaning of words and constructions 
in naturally occurring and ongoing conversation may change surprisingly fast. All 
of the above theories have shown that a word or construction may mean one thing 
or perform one act at any given time, and mean or do something entirely different 
a moment later, such as in example (7), where the noun ‘seats’ conveyed an 
argumentative meaning almost entirely by itself, due to the particular 
intersubjective context. We will give one more very striking example here, taken 
from a recent paper by Du Bois on dialogic syntax. Consider the following 
excerpt from a conversation:
(8) A: Yet he’s still healthy.
B: He’s still walking around.
(Adapted from Du Bois 2014: 368)
What happens here, is that ‘the second speaker’s substitution of verbal walking 
around for the first speaker’s adjectival healthy invites the inference that it is an 
alternative to healthy’ (ibid.). The meaning of the verb ‘to walk around’ has 
suddenly changed completely, because now ‘healthy and walking around [can be 
seen] as two contrasting values on an ad hoc scale of health’ (ibid.: 369). 
These aspects taken together make everyday conversation into a complex 
affair. As mentioned in the introduction, the overarching concept of everyday 
conversation can of course be cut up into all kinds of language-games or activity 
types. This means that many of the conversational mechanisms described by the 
theories in this chapter will play a major role in one activity type and no role 
whatsoever in another. For example, in the case of an interrogation in a courtroom 
‘it is unlikely that either party assumes the other is fulfilling the maxims of 
quality, manner, and especially quantity’ (Levinson 1992: 76), whereas at a 
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wedding or a dinner party such strategic and uncooperative communication plays 
a far less prominent role. 
However, such nuances need not worry us here: our main point from the onset 
was that naturally occurring conversation in general involves at least some of the 
above aspects, and that as such it displays a high complexity. In fact, speakers 
often do not know which activity type they are participating in (e.g. due to what 
Walton & Krabbe have dubbed ‘illicit shifts’ between types (1995: 65)), and are 
therefore in many cases not even sure themselves about which of the five aspects 
are most prominent. As such, the varieties in frequency and intensity of the 
conversational mechanisms across different activity types add yet another level of 
complexity to the overarching category of everyday conversation as a whole. 
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2. 
The pragmatics of liturgical language
In this chapter, we will analyze the Liturgy of the Roman Catholic Mass (see 
appendix2), in order to determine to what extent the five aspects of conversation, 
as lined up in the previous chapter, can be found in Mass as well. We may expect 
there to be significant differences, if only because the words and sentences of the 
Liturgy are fifteen to twenty centuries old, whereas most naturally occurring 
conversations between two or more people vanish into thin air as soon as the last 
word has been said. Each of the members of the congregation attending Mass 
knows in advance what will be on the menu – a situation that is diametrically 
opposed to everyday conversations. Such obvious differences do not seem to need 
much further investigation. However, as we will see in this chapter, it is useful to 
make even the obvious differences explicit if we want to give a full description of 
Mass. Furthermore, they will have interesting consequences on deeper levels, as 
will become clear in the third chapter.
2.1 Action
We have seen how a conversation in many ways is a chain of actions, performed 
by both interlocutors. That this counts for ritual language as well has been 
observed often before. SAT has been applied to religious (mostly biblical) and 
ritualistic language, predominantly in the fields of theology, anthropology or the 
philosophy of religion (Evans 1963, Ladriere 1973, Bailey 1993, Hilborn 1994, 
Rappaport 1995, Wolterstorff 1995, Briggs 2001 and Williams-Tinajero 2008 
among others). Especially Austin’s notion of the performative force of language 
has been used to talk about the meaning of religious language. Austin himself 
already understood that his ideas had at least some relation to religious ritual, as 
becomes clear from his examples involving acts such as christening and baptizing 
(1962: 24). Searle too surmised the usefulness of SAT for the study of religious 
language, stating in a footnote that ‘when God says ‘Let there be light’ that is a 
declaration’ (1976: 15).
However, there are of course more speech acts involved in the Liturgy than 
just declarations. Wheelock gives a nice overview of which types of sentence 
2 Each of the liturgical utterances in the appendix has been numbered. In this chapter and the 
following, I will refer to an utterance by giving its number, e.g. (2), and sometimes by giving the 
number and the utterance itself, in which cases I will put them between arrowheads e.g. <(2) 
Amen.> (source: http://www.latinliturgy.com/OrdinaryFormMassText.pdf).
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mood are most common in Mass, as presented in table 4, which may serve as a 
helpful orientation here:
Table 4: Wheelock’s analysis of the different moods in Mass (1984)  
The first striking observation is that Mass does not involve any questions, i.e. 
sentences with interrogative mood, whatsoever. Also, it becomes clear from Table 
4 that in 50% of the cases, the sentences in Mass indicate that something is the 
case (5), in 25% they express a command (4), and for the remaining 25% they 
express a wish or desire (7). Wheelock gives a few more interesting statistical 
facts: the 1st pers. indicative sentences, which make up 40% of all the indicatives, 
have as their major verb categories ‘confessing (5), professing belief (43), 
praising (24), offering (90), and praying (89)’; 80% of the imperatives in Mass are 
directed towards Jesus (10) or God (17), the other 20% being uttered by the priest 
to the consecration (4); most of the optative sentences are 3rd pers. to 1st pers. 
blessings, such as (7), whereas the remaining cases are 3rd pers. to 2nd pers. (3) or 
3rd pers. to 3rd. pers. (84) optatives (1984: 65-72). 
However, as insightful as this overview may be, it is important to note here 
that the mood of an utterance and its illocutionary point may of course deviate 
completely, if only for the fact that some speech acts are indirectly conveyed. 
Returning to the example of ‘It’s freezing in here!’, we need to recall that 
although the mood of the sentence is indicative, as a speech act it is not only a 
representative, but (possibly) also a directive and/or expressive. We may expect to 
find such indirect speech acts in the Liturgy as well. In table 5, on the next page, I 
give an overview. I have lined up the five basic illocutionary acts along both the 
vertical and horizontal axis. The utterances that fall into a box flanked by the 
same illocution on both sides (e.g. representatives-representatives) are pure 
examples of that type, whereas utterances that fall into a box with two different 
types have features of both (with no emphasis on which illocution is more direct 
than the other). 
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Table 5: The distribution of speech acts in Mass
I will briefly illustrate my reasoning in categorizing the utterances in this way, by 
discussing two examples. I have categorized <(17) we give you thanks for your 
great glory, Lord God> as an expressive-declaration, because in Searle’s book 
thanking is an expressive speech act (1976: 12), which, I would contend, is 
declaratively performed in uttering the words (see also Levinson 1983: 228). 
<(118) keep me always faithful to your commandments> is a commissive-
directive, in that it commands God to keep the speaker faithful, which in fact 
expresses the speaker’s intention to remain faithful. 
A number of noteworthy observations can be made on the basis of this 
overview. Firstly, as said, the Liturgy too seems to contain a lot of indirect speech 
acts, which shows from the fact that many of the utterances can be categorized 
26
under multiple types of illocutionary point. Hilborn too points out that the 
utterances in a church service display a high degree of ‘pragmatic ambivalence’ 
(1994: 309), and that the liturgy ‘reveals considerably (…) complex, categories of 
multivalent illocutionary action’ (ibid.: 310). For example, when discussing the 
Credo (43)-(68), Hilborn states that an utterance like <(43) I believe in one God, 
the Father almighty (...)> is an ‘assertive-expressive-commissive’, because in such 
a case the ‘assertive-expressive discourse will either effect commitment, or else 
more typically mediate re-commitment (…) to truth-claims made already’ (ibid.: 
314). Although (43) would strictly speaking not be a commissive in a SAT-
account, I do agree with Hilborn that it can be interpreted that way, leading me to 
categorize the four explicit professions of belief in the Credo, namely (43), (44), 
(61) and (65), under several illocutions. I applied this line of reasoning to a few 
other utterances as well. Secondly, we see that there are no purely commissive 
illocutions in Mass. It seems that even though participants in Mass clearly mean to 
commit themselves to future courses of action, this dimension of Mass is mainly 
implicit, resonating in other utterances, such as the professions of belief in the 
Credo mentioned above. Thirdly, we see how table 4 and table 5 roughly coincide, 
in that the prevalence of indicatives/representatives, imperatives/directives and 
optatives/expressives is equal in both overviews. Fourthly, it is interesting to note 
that Mass indeed seems to involve a lot of performative language. 
We will return to some of these observations later. For now it is enough to 
conclude that the aspect of action, so ubiquitous in everyday language, is also an 
obvious aspect of the Liturgy. Searle’s conclusion that ‘there are a rather limited 
number of basic things we do with language’ in naturally occurring conversation 
applies equally well to Mass.
With regards to the conversational speech acts, we will discuss them mainly 
in the fourth paragraph of this chapter. However, looking closely at the Liturgy, 
we can already point out thirteen adjacency pairs in Mass. I give an overview of 
these in table 6 on the next page (in which I have called the optative utterances 
‘evaluations’, meaning that they express a wish and as such make an evaluation of 
reality, and in two cases dubbed an utterance ‘completion’, in that they finish an 
utterance initiated by another speaker). What becomes clear from this overview, is 
that Mass only displays a truly conversational turn-taking construction when the 
priest, deacon and the people are interacting with one another (i.e. mainly in the 
Introit and Gradual). Contrastingly, when the priest, deacon and/or people address 
Christ or God, neither of the latter two ever replies, which makes these segments 
(e.g. Gloria, Offertorium, Eucharist) more like monologues, or recitals. That is, 
these parts may still be seen as ‘conversational’ in the broader context of Mass, 
except that in these segments, the addressees are listening, yet not responding. 
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Table 6: The adjacency pairs in Mass
2.2 Cooperation
As I mentioned in the introduction, little research has been done concerning the 
intersubjective or cooperative nature of language and what this means for 
religious language use. However, Verhagen writes that 
‘even in the absence of an actual speaker, an addressee (for example, the 
reader of an ancient text) always takes a linguistic utterance as having 
been intentionally produced as an instrument of communication by 
another being with the same basic cognitive capacities as the addressee’ 
(2005: 7).
Are participants in Mass ‘readers’ of the ‘ancient text’ of the Liturgy? On the 
most basic level – the CC-level of Oswald – they are, in the sense Verhagen 
meant, ‘readers’: they assume indeed that the words of the Liturgy are meaningful 
and relevant, and as such they try to deal with the text as being written by 
intentional agents. Yet, on the levels of IC and PC, they are not so much readers 
as performers, in that they are not trying to grasp the intentions of the writer(s) of 
the text, but that of the other participants as the recitalists of it. That is, they are 
not interested in what was meant with the words when they were first written 
down or spoken, but in what is meant with them in the present performance of the 
ritual. As we have seen in the previous paragraph, some segments of Mass display 
a clear conversational structure, others a monological structure. Therefore, the 
whole of Mass should be regarded as an interplay of different intentional agents, 
each with their own specific, intentional role. These agents are, quite simply: the 
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priest, the deacon, the people (the human agents), Christ and God (the divine 
agents).
The question is then: to what extent are these agents cooperating (i.e. taking 
each other’s perspectives, forming joint goals and focussing their joint attention 
thereon)? As for the interactional relation between the priest, deacon and people, a 
first striking observation is that all requests and offers are accepted and none are 
refused (see table 6). By the same token, also clearly visible in table 6, each of the 
adjacency pairs that have as their first pair part an informing or evaluating 
utterance, have as their second pair part an acknowledgment, or completion. 
Furthermore, each of the utterances by the priest that conveys a directive 
illocutionary point and is addressed at the people (which make up 20% of all 
imperative utterances, see table 4) have as a result that the requested action is 
indeed executed. Finally, it is of interest here that the etymological meaning of the 
word amen is ‘so be it’ (Chidester 2000: 75). As this representative-declaration is 
uttered eight times throughout the Mass (seven times by the people, once by the 
deacon), it may serve as another indication of the absolute agreement between the 
priest, deacon and people on all utterances and speech acts in Mass. We conclude, 
then, that the human agents are definitely to a high degree cooperating with each 
other. Agreement seems to be a landmark feature of the interactional speech in 
Mass. Just imagine how absurd it would be if the priest were to utter <(71) it will 
become for us the bread of life>, with the people replying in unison: ‘No, it will 
not’, or ‘We are not so sure about that’. 
At this point, we have to say some things about the common ground (see 
paragraph 1.4) of the participants in Mass. Clark distinguishes between 
‘communal common ground’ and ‘personal common ground’ (1996: 100), of 
which the former is most important here. Communal common ground stems from 
the fact that ‘we often categorize people by [cultural communities] as a basis for 
inferring what they know, believe, or assume’ (ibid.). For example, when Pete 
discovers that Jane is a linguist from Australia, he knows that she is a member of 
two communities, namely linguists and Australians, and he infers from this a vast 
number of beliefs and assumptions on the part of Jane (such as that she is familiar 
with linguistic terminology, knows certain things about the history of Australia 
etc.). Now, if Pete is also a linguist, then he shares with Jane the communal inside 
information (‘particular information that members of [a] community mutually 
assume is possessed by members of the community’) of the community of 
linguists (ibid.: 101). In the case of religious communities, members share a form 
of ‘expertise’ on at least a number of aspects, such as ‘religious doctrines, rituals, 
icons, historical figures’ etc. (ibid.: 103). Furthermore, they share a ‘specialized 
lexicon’, exclusively used within their community (with concepts such as ‘Holy 
Spirit’, ‘Lamb’, ‘Son of God’), and they carry out ‘routine actions’, as 
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‘procedures for joint activities’ (ibid.: 109) (e.g. confessing at the start of Mass, as 
in (4)-(6)). At a deeper level, participants in Mass share certain types of 
knowledge that Clark calls ‘ultimate inside information’ (ibid.: 110). Mass is 
something to be experienced physically (talking, listening, washing, kneeling, 
eating), and such private sensations are completely subjective. However, Mass is 
of course a collective procedure. Therefore, even such ultimate inside information 
is actually part of the inside information of the community of participants in 
Mass, and as such is part of the intersubjective dimension – which shows how 
detailed the common ground of the participants in Mass is.
Indeed, we may conclude from all of the above that the common ground and 
the adherence to the cooperative principle in Mass are actually extraordinarily 
deeply rooted and fixed, on all three levels of cooperation (CC, IC and PC). 
Amazingly, all of this is in a way already conveyed simply by the attendance of 
those present at Mass, in that ‘the people who take part in church, synagogue or 
mosque rites are displaying their membership in [their] religion’ (ibid.: 117) 
through their attendance, to themselves and each other (see also Rappaport 1995: 
76). Their attendance is an indexical demonstration of their sharing in the 
communal common ground and adhering to the cooperative principle within that 
particular community. This coincides nicely with our observation in the previous 
paragraph, that the commissive illocutions in Mass are always conveyed 
indirectly through other illocutions. The act of committing oneself to the 
community and the truth-claims in Mass needs not be explicitly performed, since 
it resonates, as it were, in all the other acts performed therein. The best example 
of this is the recital of the Credo, which is uttered by all human agents and is 
directed at themselves.
2.3 Strategy
Knowing how deeply rooted and fixed the common ground of the participants in 
Mass is, we may expect there to be little to no strategic language use involved. In 
a context where everybody agrees with one another, and even states collectively 
and simultaneously that they do, there seems to be little room nor interest for 
deception or personal benefits. Hilborn, too, states that ‘it might seem axiomatic 
that a Christian ‘believer’ would not say what s/he ‘believed to be false’, and 
especially not in worship’ (1994: 350). Still, the Liturgy exhibits many cases in 
which the literal meaning and the implied meaning of an utterance differ, as 
became clear from those utterances in table 4 that fell into a mixed box of two 
illocutionary acts. Hilborn points out that Grice’s remarks on metaphor are also of 
interest here, even lecturing that ‘any linguistic analysis of religious discourse 
must take metaphoric inference seriously if it is to be sensitive to the operation of 
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such discourse’ (1994: 338). Although I agree with Hilborn, I will not treat 
metaphor too extensively here, since I view it as mainly a semantic issue, not a 
pragmatic one. Just to mention one example: when in (120) Christ, represented by 
the host, is called ‘Lamb of God’ by the priest, this can be seen as a violation of 
the first maxim of Quality, since the priest obviously does not believe that Christ 
is literally a lamb. However, the congregation will infer ‘that the speaker is 
attributing to [Christ] some feature or features in respect of which [Christ] 
resembles (…) the mentioned [animal] (Grice 1975: 53). As such, 
(conventionalized) implicatures play an important role with regard to the symbolic 
imagery in Mass. 
Does Mass involve any strategic language use in the sense of uncooperative 
communication? Do people lie, deceive or manipulate in Mass – is that even 
possible? It seems not, because although ‘not all who participate in liturgical 
discourse are equally, or even barely, committed to its truth claims (…), ritual and 
institutional prerogatives supersede personal intentionalities’ (Hilborn 1994: 352), 
meaning that it would not really matter if some of the participants in Mass did not 
fulfil each of the sincerity conditions appropriate to the different speech acts (see 
table 1). The priest may utter <(112) Let us offer each other the sign of peace> 
while thinking ‘I could not care less if we did or not’, but this is not likely to be 
the case, because if it were, there would be no reason for him to participate in the 
ritual in the first place. Besides, the ritual could be executed further without any 
problems. Strangely enough, it really is more important that the priest speaks the 
words, than that he believes in them. 
Does the Liturgy contain utterances that function first and foremost on the 
intersubjective level, and only secondarily on the objective level (see figure 3)? 
Taking a step back and glancing from a bird’s-eye-view at the 135 utterances 
listed and numbered in the appendix, we notice how practically all of them are 
concerned more or less directly with the ongoing ritual. That is, they function 
primarily within the relationship between speaker and hearer, i.e. priest and 
congregation, priest and Christ/God, priest and deacon and congregation and 
Christ/God. This needs not surprise us, as we had already determined in paragraph 
2.1 that directives are abundant, and that Mass as a whole displays a primitive 
conversational structure. It seems that if we were to call Mass a ‘conversation’, it 
would be, in a way, a self-referential conversation, in that the things said by the 
interlocutors deal mostly with their interpersonal relations (e.g. (5), (6), (13)-17)), 
and that whole segments of the interaction are explicit procedural utterances (e.g. 
(4), (28), (30), (70), (89)), addressing what needs to be done next. This primary 
dyadic relationship also becomes clear from Wheelock’s observation that Mass 
has basically five major themes (‘utterance types sharing a common topic’), 
namely confession, praise, belief, prayer and sacrifice (1984: 70), each of which 
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Figure 4: The primary dyadic relation in Mass
involves at least two agents. So, Mass is really an intersubjective, and even 
argumentative procedure, in which the triadic relation of speaker-hearer-object is 
secondary to the dyadic relation of speaker-hearer. Therefore, figure 3 (repeated 
here as figure 4) is a proper representation of Mass as well, since the ritual too 
functions primarily on the lower horizontal line, at the intersubjective level:
   
2.4 Uncertainty
We saw in the previous chapter that everyday conversation involves a lot of 
uncertainty. We often do not know in advance what we are going to say, or what 
the other person is going to say, and as such are not sure how the conversation 
will unfold, in what direction it will take us. On top of that, even though human 
communication on the whole is an ingenious and extremely efficient procedure, 
conversations often suffer from confusion and misunderstanding. As we have 
seen, CA laid bare conversational mechanisms that function specifically to erase 
such uncertainties (e.g. repair-initiators and repairs, pre-requests, pre-questions, 
go-aheads, gist, and upshot). Obviously, none of these issues play a role in Mass. 
We already concluded from Wheelock’s overview in table 4 that the Liturgy 
contains no questions. Neither the priest, the congregation, Christ or God are 
addressed in interrogative sentences – this function of language simply plays no 
role in this particular activity. Such conversational speech acts as repair-initiators, 
gist or upshot are unthinkable in Mass: it would for example be absurd if the 
people were to reply collectively to the utterances of the priest by saying ‘We beg 
your pardon?’ or ‘Did you mean pray right now?’3 
In Gricean terms we could say that ‘the parameters of Relevance in liturgy are 
more sharply defined than in, say, a ‘casual chat’ between friends’ (Hilborn 1994: 
3 The only conversational speech acts that can be said to play a role in Mass are perhaps 
procedural speech acts. (1)-(3), for example, can be seen as a pre-announcement to (4), or to what 
follows in general, as goes for the announcements of the reading in the Gradual, such as (28), (38), 
(40). Examples of post-expansions can be found as well, such as (7), which may be regarded as a 
sequence-closing third, followed by the pre-closing in (8).
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352-353). The range of allowed-for contributions to the ongoing activity is 
extremely limited in Mass; participants cannot suddenly start discussing last 
week’s football game or the latest developments in quantum mechanics (unless 
perhaps the priest, if he refers to such unrelated matters to illustrate a relevant 
point). We can state quite plainly that the aspect of uncertainty, as paramount as it 
is in naturally occurring conversation, is not shared by Mass.
2.5 Fluctuation
Turning to the aspect of fluctuation, finally, we need to understand once more the 
gravity of the old age of Mass, as opposed to the spontaneous occurrence of 
everyday dialogical interaction. When I tell you that ‘It’s freezing in here!’, and 
you are sitting by the open window, the context determines the directive meaning 
of my remark. If you then close the window, and one minute later I repeat my 
complaint, the directive meaning is not there anymore. The semantic meaning of 
my words was consistent throughout both utterances, but the pragmatic meaning 
differed completely. Similarly, when Ken angrily calls out ‘Joanne!’, to make his 
girlfriend come downstairs because they are late for the party, his utterance of her 
name means something different than when he says it a minute later in the car, in 
the following exchange:
(9) Joanne: That is so typical of you, Ken.
Ken: That is not at all typical of me, Joanne.
(Adapted from Du Bois 2014: 361)
In (9), the utterance of ‘Joanne’ echoes that of ‘Ken’, and conveys irony, while 
back in the house the same utterance had a directive meaning (‘Hurry up!’). Such 
an example shows how the use of words in different language-games determines 
their meaning, and how in conversation we sometimes makes a ‘dialogical shift’ 
(Walton & Krabbe 1995: 100) from one ‘language-game’ to another swiftly and 
unannounced.
Such rapid alternations of meanings are wholly absent from Mass. There, 
speakers have nor take the liberty to alter the meaning of words and constructions 
in the process, as interlocutors in conversation often do. The high level of 
agreement between the participants encompasses the meanings of the words used 
in the ritual – both in the semantic and the pragmatic sense. Meaning in Mass is 
not in flux. On the contrary, it has remained practically unchanged (except for 
sporadic revisions of theological doctrine) for two millennia.
33
2.6 Mass as an activity type
At last, we can take a step back and scan the landscape of this chapter, in order to 
sum up our conclusions. Table 8 (on page 36) presents a rough overview of our 
findings. Of course, we ought to be more precise. Therefore, we will first define 
the notion of activity type a bit more sharply. 
Levinson defines activity types as ‘goal-defined, socially constituted, 
bounded, events with constraints on allowable contributions’ (1992: 69). Clark 
adopts Levinson’s definition, basic distinctions and examples, but goes on to 
refine the whole thing, opting for the term ‘joint activities’. He distinguishes five 
main gradients of difference: 
Table 7: The main differences between joint activities (Clark 1996: 31)
Also, Clark agrees with Levinson that joint activities are goal-defined, but he 
distinguishes further between the domain goal (the dominant goal), procedural 
goals (e.g. doing it properly and efficiently), interpersonal goals (e.g. maintaining 
contact with fellow participants) and private agendas (ibid.: 34). 
Let us combine the defining traits given by Levinson and Clark and see if and 
how they are represented by the joint activity of Mass. First of all, Mass is of 
course a socially constituted joint activity, executed only by the Catholic 
community. Also, it has a ceremonial opening and closing and as such is tacitly 
bounded. As we have seen, it allows for virtually no contribution from external 
sources at all. As for Clark’s dimensions of variation in table 7, we have already 
seen that Mass is scripted, formal and cooperative. As for the verbal/non-verbal 
distinction, Mass lies somewhere in between these two far ends, since therein the 
‘words and acts are related and integrated in most complex ways’ (Levinson 1992: 
70).4 There is also a clear autocratic dimension to Mass, in that the priests and 
deacons are on a higher hierarchical level than the congregation, the latter group 
being responsible only for about 8% of all the utterances, consisting mostly of 
4 Although Levinson is definitely right in emphasizing the importance of gestures and physical 
acts in Mass, I have chosen not to discuss them in the present paper, and have consequently not 
incorporated them in the appendix. See Wheelock (1984) for an interesting (quantitative) analysis 
of these gestures (e.g. the different positions at the altar, genuflecting, kissing the bible, joining or 
extending hands etc.).
34
short, affirmative phrases. Then again, there is an egalitarian dimension as well, in 
that the human agents as a group are equally subordinated to the divine agents, 
since the latter are yet on a higher level than the priests and deacons. 
Turning to the goals of Mass, we see that the domain goal is the salvation of 
the participants, who re-enact the Last Supper and sacrifice Christ in order to ‘be 
filled with every grace and heavenly blessing’ and ‘bring eternal life’ to 
themselves (113). As for procedural goals, we notice how, for example, the first 
two utterances in Mass are already an announcement stating that what is to follow 
will be performed in a particular way, in the name of. Also, many of the directive 
speech acts in Mass are directed at God, asking him to make the ongoing 
procedure ‘spiritual and acceptable’ (98)-(100). Such utterances are an indication 
of the importance of ceremonially determined actions. The interpersonal goals are 
of course clearly reflected in the intense level of cooperation and in the underlying 
commissive point (90)-(92). Consequently, there really are no private agendas in 
Mass (i.e. nobody is joining the activity for personal benefits that others are not 
aware of), and even if there were, they would not really influence the activity, 
since the institutional rules supersede any private intentions.
Lifting from the rightmost column in table 8 the most important linguistic 
features, and combining them with the abovementioned defining traits, we can 
give a characterization of Mass as a joint activity (borrowing some formulations 
from Searle (1976: 22-23)):
The Roman Catholic Mass is a scripted activity that:
(a) is participated in and performed by members of the Catholic
community, who  
(b) interact with each other and with Christ/God in formal dialogical and 
monological conversation,
(c) always communicating in a completely cooperatively manner,
(c1) by telling each other and Christ/God how things are and
(c1.1) by always agreeing thereon,
(c2) by trying to get each other and Christ/God to do things and
(c2.1) by always doing these things (when possible),
(c3) and by expressing their feelings and attitudes,
(d) demonstrating therein that they commit themselves to the community, 
the hierarchical order within the community, the ongoing event and to 
the truth-claims made in the event, as such
(e) bringing about (social and personal) changes through their utterances,
(f) to achieve the goal of the activity: the salvation of all participants.
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The mission of the first two chapters is hereby accomplished. We have 
determined precisely what sort of joint activity Mass is, simply by describing 
those features that lie on the surface of Mass, i.e. that make up its form, as 
opposed to its content (Rappaport 1979). By ‘correctly piecing together’ 
linguistic-pragmatic surface phenomena ‘without adding anything’, we have come 
up with a clear and useful description of what people do in Mass, and of how they 
do it, without asking for the essence or meaning of the ritual, allowing ‘the 
satisfaction being sought through [an] explanation [to] follow of itself’ 
(Wittgenstein 1993: 121). In the next chapter, we will continue in this vein, 
focussing more closely at how some of the liturgical keywords are used.
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Table 8: The differences between ordinary conversation and the Liturgy
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3.
Philosophical implications
As I announced in the introduction, the purpose of this paper is twofold. We have 
reached our first goal by giving a clear description of the pragmatic dimension of 
Mass. With this description and the Liturgy in the appendix close at hand, we are 
now in the perfect position to take our cue from Wittgenstein once more, and look 
more closely at how some of the keywords in the Liturgy are really used. Instead 
of asking ‘What is God?’, ‘Does God exist?’ or ‘What is salvation?’, we will 
examine what the specific use of nouns such as ‘God’ or ‘Son’, or verbs such as 
‘confess’ or ‘accept’, can tell us about fundamental Christian concepts such as 
divinity and salvation. First, we will focus on the reality of God, by describing the 
relationship between the human agents on the one hand, and the divine agents on 
the other. Second, we will discuss the nature of salvation, zooming in on the 
peculiar role of some of the performative verbs in Mass. Thirdly, we will make a 
crucial observation concerning the common ground of the community. Finally, we 
will discuss some activity types similar to Mass, and ‘turn around’ to determine 
what the counterparts of liturgical language in everyday conversation are, using 
the results of our investigation to draw a conclusion about naturally occurring 
conversation as well.
3.1 The grammar of God
We have not yet discussed one important dimension of interaction in Mass, 
namely that between the human and the divine agents – between the priest, 
deacon and congregation on the one hand, and Christ and God on the other. As 
said, the latter two never ‘talk’ in Mass5, i.e. they never reply to any of the 
directive and expressive utterances directed at them. Requests for acceptance (90), 
protection (92), and inclusion (96) are not demonstrably received as such. In fact, 
it is not even clear if Christ and God are present, while the whole event in certain 
respects revolves around them. It would be perfectly conceivable that one or more 
of the participants in Mass were appointed to voice the replies of these divinities, 
as such involving them in the dialogical sequences, making them tangible 
participants in the conversational construction. Why is the explicit presence of 
Christ and God (simply ‘God’ from hereon) not a requirement for Mass to be a 
successful activity?
5 Christ is of course directly quoted in (102)-(103). However, precisely because these are citations, 
uttered by the priest, they do not count as utterances of Christ. This is also my reason for not 
numbering them separately. 
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In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein writes that ‘grammar tells 
what kind of object anything is’, which means that looking at how a word is used 
(in what contexts it plays a role, which words or constructions it is combined with 
etc.), allows us to see more clearly what the nature of the referred-to object is. He 
lets this remark be followed by a brief but essential interjection: ‘(Theology as 
grammar)’ (1953: §373). Let us look, then, at the grammar of the word ‘God’. 
Kellenberger endows us with a helpful example: 
‘[T]he Psalmist is doing many things in the Psalms: rejoicing in God, 
blessing God, praising God, asking of God, thanking God, crying out to 
God, and at times expressing his sense of being far from God. One thing 
the Psalmist is not doing is formulating an epistemological theory’ 
(1990: 160). 
Nowhere in the Psalms does it say: ‘O Lord, you exist’ or ‘O Lord, I doubt that 
you are really there’, but that is ‘not to say that no epistemic concepts are at work 
in the Psalms (…): the Psalmist beholds, he finds God, he discovers God’s 
presence’. He is simply ‘not trying to prove God’s existence to himself or to 
anyone’ (ibid.: 160-161). Similarly, the whole question of the existence of God 
plays no role in Mass, but is simply part and parcel with all the other acts and 
utterances of the process. We have seen that the participants in Mass are doing 
many things as well: acting in the name of God (1), confessing to God (5), 
praising, blessing, adoring, glorifying and thanking God (13)-(17), believing in 
God (43), commanding God (81), granting offers to God (90), recounting the 
story of the Last Supper to God (101)-(103). Looking at this broad variety of acts, 
beliefs and attitudes that involve God, it seems that the existence and presence of 
the divine is, as it were, ‘built into’ the fabric of Mass, and as such needs not be 
explicitly confirmed. Why, we feel inclined to ask, does Mass not begin with a 
statement like ‘The Lord is unquestionably real, therefore we will now…’ or ‘O 
Lord, if you are there, please accept this offer…’? The answer is: because the 
reality of God is determined by the activities in Mass – his ‘ear’ is built into the 
words addressed at him.
Learning to know the reality of God means learning how to use the word 
‘God’. The reality of the divine follows from the practical applications of the 
divine in the lives of believers, not the other way around (Martin 1984: 609). For 
example, what becomes clear from these observations, is that although God is to a 
certain extent definitely an anthropomorphic concept, there are also ‘holes’ in the 
grammar of our language involving God, if we were to regard it as really 
describing a human being (Wittgenstein 1996: 71). For example, we act in God’s 
name, we confess to him, we thank, praise and command him, but we do not tell 
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God a joke or ask him for directions to the bookshop. Also, we speak of God’s 
voice, eyes and hands, but not about his eyebrows or elbows (ibid.). Such 
observations make it clear that even though believers address God with titles such 
as ‘Father’, ‘Son’, ‘King’, ‘Lord’ etc., his reality is not assumed to be of the same 
ontological category as that of actual fathers, sons, kings or lords. Only certain 
aspects of such earthly phenomena contribute to the conception of the divine, and 
these aspects constitute the grammar of God.6 Looking at the different actions we 
carry out with regards to God (praise, ask, thank, confess, command etc.), we can 
conclude that the aspect of real-life interpersonal relations that is most noticeably 
reflected in the relationship between the human and the divine in Mass, is the 
ethical dimension of responsibility, guilt and forgiveness. This already became 
clear from some of Wheelock’s major themes of Mass (confession, praise, belief, 
prayer, sacrifice), which served as an indication of how Mass functions mainly 
within the dyadic relationship between the participants (cf. paragraph 2.3). The 
theme of confession, for example, deals directly with the interpersonal 
relationship between speaker and hearer, with the former confessing to the latter 
to be forgiven. So, when we project the interaction between the human and the 
divine agents in Mass onto Verhagen’s model of intersubjectivity, we see that it 
too functions primarily at the intersubjective level:
Figure 5: The primarily intersubjective interaction between the 
human and the divine agents in Mass
The appropriateness of figure 5 also shows from the fact that believers never just 
inform God about something purely for the sake of informing (if only because he 
is often assumed to be all-knowing – that, too, is part of the grammar of God). 
Interaction with the divine hardly ever concerns humans describing states of 
affairs in the world to their deities, but nearly always involves humans expressing 
certain wishes, desires, regrets etc. about how the world ought to be (see criterion 
6 As Hilborn already pointed out, the key terms here are metaphor and metonymy. Lakoff and 
Johnson also state that ‘the conceptual systems of cultures and religions are metaphorical in 
nature’ and that ‘symbolic metonymies that are grounded in our physical experience provide an 
essential means of comprehending religious and cultural concept’ (1980: 40).
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(c3) on page 44). This also helps to explain the underlying commissive point of 
Mass (reflected in criterion (d)): when reciting the Credo, for example, (which 
contains many of the purely representative illocutions in table 5), believers are not 
so much informing each other or God about states of affairs in the world, but are 
really reconfirming to each other that they still commit to the creedal truth-claims 
– and that they intend to keep doing so in the future. Using Searle’s terminology, 
we could say that the Credo has a world-to-words direction of fit (see table 1).
We see how the language of Mass shows that the ritual should be seen as the 
dyadic interaction between human and divine agents, with the former petitioning 
the latter to be forgiven and granted mercy, and that the reality of God is perfectly 
adapted to this goal, in that he is almighty and able to listen, accept and forgive. 
Such are the divine qualities needed by the congregation in order for them to 
achieve salvation – and therefore precisely those qualities are attributed to God in 
the performance of the ritual. Human beings do not forgive, accept, grant, bless, 
command or approve with their feet, elbows or eyebrows, but with their voices, 
eyes, ears and hands; and because God has to perform precisely those acts in the 
lives of believers, there is no use for feet, elbows and eyebrows, and all the more 
for hands, ears, eyes and a voice in the conception of God. As such, the grammar 
of God is shaped in the act of asking him for forgiveness. 
3.2 The performance of salvation
We have seen how the divine agents are often addressed by the human agents 
through directive and expressive speech acts. Looking more closely at what it is 
that the human agents request or command God to do, we notice that in most 
cases, these are precisely the demands for salvation that we would expect to find:
(7) ‘forgive us our sins’
(79) ‘may we be accepted by you’
(84) ‘may the Lord accept the sacrifice’
(90) ‘accept and bless these gifts’
(91) ‘grant her peace’
(92) ‘grant that in all things we may be defended’
(94) ‘accept this oblation’
(96) ‘command that we be delivered’
(98) ‘be pleased, to bless, acknowledge, and approve’
(107) ‘command’ that these gifts be borne’
(124) ‘only say the word and my soul shall be healed’
(131) ‘may almighty God bless you’
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These acts of salvation (the italicized verbs) that the human agents demand from 
God, are all performative acts (except for ‘command’, which is a directive), 
embedded in directive and expressive speech acts. They are precisely those acts 
that the human agents cannot perform by themselves. The community wishes to 
be forgiven and blessed, and it is their offer that has to be accepted, acknowledged 
and approved – i.e. the whole point of the activity is that they will be saved, but 
this can only be done by God. There is no explicit confirmation, however, of 
whether this demand is successful.
On the one hand, then, we could conclude that Mass is an open-ended story, in 
that participants can only hope to have achieved their joint domain goal (which is 
of course a good reason to act out the whole thing again a week later). On the 
other hand, however, the underlying commissive point of Mass comes about 
through the complete cooperation among all agents (criterion (c), (c1.1) and 
(c2.1)). By the same token, the reality of God is intrinsic to and shaped by the 
ways in which the human agents collectively interact with him, meaning Mass 
also has an underlying performative point. That is, the reality of God is not a 
prerequisite for Mass, but is declaratively constituted in performing the ritual. As 
for salvation, we could say that the goal of Mass is reached by collectively 
addressing a demand for salvation at God, who has the will and power to grant 
such salvation, and whose reality is constituted in the act of demanding, meaning 
that the goal of the activity is achieved by the performance of its realization (see 
Rappaport (1995) for a similar view on the function of ritual and religion). The 
reality of God and the power of salvation are not (only) described, discussed, 
refined or confirmed in Mass, but are constituted, established, made real therein. 
Therefore, Mass actually has both a world-to-words and a words-to-world 
direction of fit, in that its performance makes something to be the case, which is 
the case if and only if it is performed. Interestingly, the word ‘Eucharist’ derives 
from the Greek eucharistein, meaning ‘to give thanks’ (Chidester 2000: 73). In 
paragraph 2.1, I categorized thanking as an expressive-declaration, in that the 
expressive act of thanking is declaratively performed in uttering the words. If 
Mass is essentially not only a ritual of salvation but also one of ‘thanksgiving’, 
that helps us understand where the underlying performative point partly derives 
from. (As said, thanking is also an expressive illocution. Since expressives have 
no direction of fit according to Searle, it seems Mass as a whole is a paradoxical 
activity that involves both and neither directions of fit at the same time.)
One indication of the underlying performative force of Mass is the abundance 
of ‘felicity conditions’ (Levinson 1983: 229). These are the required state of 
affairs that need to be in place in order for a performative utterance to do its job. 
For example, for two people to be married, the words ‘I hereby pronounce you 
husband and wife’ need to be uttered by someone with the legal authorization to 
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marry people (e.g. a priest). Likewise, Mass needs to be executed by a Catholic 
congregation, led by a priest in a required outfit, in an official church, on the 
appointed day, according to the scripted procedures etc. The ceremonial and 
ornamental aspects (dress, architecture, artworks), the scripted procedure (order of 
Mass, music, readings), the Liturgy itself – practically every aspect of Mass is a 
felicity condition, in that it cannot be omitted from the activity without the whole 
business losing its validity. The ritual could easily be performed in someone’s 
living room on a Wednesday night, but that would simply not count as a Catholic 
Mass (Searle 1995: 43). Only when each of the required conditions are in place, 
can the ritual function as a framework within which the reality of God and 
salvation can be established. To give one purely linguistic example, the Liturgy 
contains many honorary titles of address (e.g. <(6) ever-Virgin>, <(17) heavenly 
King, almighty Father>, <(18) Only Begotten Son, Lamb of God> etc.). These can 
be seen as instances of ‘social deixis’, the aspect of language that establishes 
‘certain realities of the social situation in which the speech act occurs’ (Levinson 
1983: 89), such as the tu/vous-distinction in French. As such, honorific titles of 
address are a type of speech act (Potts 2007), in that they perform the act of 
establishing social hierarchy.7 By addressing Mary, Christ and God with these 
titles, the participants express their awe, respect and love for them, dubbing them 
as ‘authorized recipients’ (Levinson 1983: 91), establishing the higher status of 
the referents, and the subordinate position of the community. 
3.3 The reinforcement of common ground
Clark writes that joint activities consist of multiple ‘joint actions’, and that they 
are ‘cumulative’, in that ‘each joint action add[s] incrementally to reaching [the 
domain] goal’ (1996: 38). What cumulates, then, ‘is the common ground of the 
participants about that activity – the knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions they 
believe they share about the activity’ (ibid.). This is of course a feature that is also 
relevant for everyday conversation: everything interlocutors say to each other is 
automatically added to the common ground about that conversation. Clark 
distinguishes three parts of the common ground:
1. Initial common ground. This is the set of background facts, 
assumptions, and beliefs the participants presupposed when they 
entered the joint activity.
7 Since these titles of address can be seen as speech acts, I could have numbered them separately in 
the appendix. However, for the sake of brevity I have chosen to regard them as part of the proper 
names referring to the divine agents in Mass. 
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2. Current state of the joint activity. This is what the participants 
presuppose to be the state of the activity at the moment.
3. Public event so far. These are the events the participants pre-
suppose have occurred in public leading up to the current state.
(Clark 1996: 43)
Finally, Clark argues that ‘accumulation of common ground occurs in all joint 
activities’ (ibid.: 39). As we have seen in the second chapter, however, the 
common ground in Mass is exceptionally deeply rooted (in that the content of the 
initial common ground has been roughly the same for centuries), and 
outstandingly fixed (in that each of the participants knows not only what the 
current state of the activity is, but also what the next one will be, and the one after 
that etc.). As such, common ground in Mass does not cumulate: no new 
information is added to it as the event progresses. On the contrary, information 
that is already known and presupposed is reconfirmed in every single act and 
utterance in Mass. Even the ‘background facts, assumptions, and beliefs’ that 
make up the initial common ground are reconfirmed. The intense level of 
cooperation and the complete agreement among all participants, combined with 
the content and procedures that were scripted and established in advance, make 
Mass into a reinforcement of common ground – the reconfirmation of truths of 
which all members of the Catholic community are already deeply convinced, even 
before they enter the church to attend the ritual.   
This observation is compatible with an important point made by some thinkers 
in the tradition of the Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, which states that 
religious beliefs (and the propositions they entail) are comparable with those 
propositions that Wittgenstein called ‘hinge propositions’, in his collected notes 
On Certainty (OC). In these notes, Wittgenstein explores the implications of some 
issues put forth by G.E. Moore, concerning absolute epistemological certainty. 
Moore contended that he knew with certainty that propositions such as ‘I am a 
human being’, ‘Here is a hand’ or ‘The earth has existed for many years’ are true, 
and that ‘the fact that he knows such things is itself fully adequate to conclude 
that the external world (…) exists’ (Martin 1984: 594). Wittgenstein objected to 
this view, because belief in such propositions cannot be justified by referring to 
any form of evidence, since the propositions ‘themselves are as certain as any 
possible evidence to which [Moore] might appeal’ (ibid.). Moore’s common sense 
propositions ‘have a logically fundamental role in our language and knowledge 
about the world’, in that they are part of our worldview, and as such determine the 
system, or framework, within which we determine whether other propositions are 
true or false. Wittgenstein calls Moore’s propositions ‘hinge propositions’, 
because they have to remain firmly in place, in order for mental processes like 
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certainty and doubt to keep making sense as they ‘revolve’ around each other. The 
hinges of our thinking cannot be questioned, because that would destroy the 
whole point of investigating what is true and what is false. Therefore, the 
propositions that constitute our worldview cannot be known in the same way as 
more contingent propositions. 
In this view, all of our talk about truth is rooted in a ‘primitive and groundless 
form of sureness in belief’ (Martin 1984: 601). This type of certainty can be 
compared to religious belief (OC §459), in that it ‘does not rest on the fact on 
which our ordinary everyday beliefs normally do rest’ (Wittgenstein 1996: 54). 
When we talk about religious beliefs, ‘we don’t talk about hypothesis, or about 
high probability. Nor about knowing. In a religious discourse we use such 
expressions as: “I  believe that so and so will happen”, and use them differently to 
the way in which we use them in science’ (Wittgenstein 1996: 57).  For example, 
Moore’s proposition ‘Here is a hand’ (…) is quite unlike ‘At this distance from 
the sun there is a planet.’ The latter must be treated as a hypothesis, but not the 
former’ (OC §52).
Like my beliefs that I have two hands, or that the sun will rise tomorrow, 
religious beliefs ‘just are ultimately groundless’ (Martin 1984: 603). In the same 
way that indisputable beliefs are true in that they underpin our entire worldview, 
‘fundamental religious dogmas are truths insofar as they constitute the immobile 
foundations of the religious faith and life’ (ibid.: 605). Clark’s notion of common 
ground is in many respects analogous to Wittgenstein’s idea of a worldview, or 
‘form of life’, one important distinction being that common ground is necessarily 
shared, whereas a worldview of immovable certainties is not. I would state, 
therefore, that (initial) common ground partly consists of the set of ‘deep’ hinge 
propositions that are mutually assumed to be shared by two interlocutors.
If Mass is the reinforcement of the common ground of the participants, then 
we see from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint that participants do not reconfirm a 
number of random ‘surface’ propositions, but those that actually make up their 
worldview – the hinge propositions of their belief, the dogmas of the Christian 
church. As Martin writes, ‘there is something extremely odd about the person who 
occupies himself in repeating to himself or in company with others the truisms of 
Moore’ (1984: 611) Indeed, when we imagine a group of people gathering weekly 
to sing and recite together propositions such as ‘We are human beings’, ‘We have 
two hands’, ‘The sun will rise tomorrow morning’ etc., such a scene strikes us as 
very peculiar. However, we now understand that what goes on during Mass, and 
perhaps during other religious rituals, is, in a way, not very different. The crucial 
discrepancy is of course that a congregation reconfirming together Moore’s 
propositions will meet with few objections from outside, whereas ‘Christian 
beliefs have never compelled unilateral consensus’. In fact, the confirmation of 
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Christian beliefs are ‘just what set the man of faith over against the masses’ (ibid.: 
612). We recognize that
‘when the believer explicitly acknowledges those creedal beliefs which 
separate him off from most men, the act is not lacking significance. It is 
precisely the friction between the believer and the world which generates 
the occasion for confessing those truths of faith’ (ibid.). 
The reinforcement of common ground in Mass constitutes a set of ‘institutional 
facts’ and a form of ‘social reality’ (Searle 1995), in that it sets a group of people 
apart from others, by emphasizing their mutual worldview. Inwardly the ritual has 
a binding function, whereas outwardly it constitutes separation. Importantly, this 
happens not on a reasonable basis, but on a much more passionate one. We have 
seen how Mass really functions in the intersubjective dimension (see figure 5), 
meaning that the epistemic beliefs of participants about facts in the world is really 
secondary to their goals on the interpersonal level. As Wittgenstein mused, 
religious belief is ‘like a passionate commitment to a system of reference’ 
(Wittgenstein 1984: 64) – i.e. a passionate commitment to a network of dogmas 
that make up the Christian worldview. Recalling the underlying commissive 
illocutionary point we detected in the second chapter, we can conclude here that 
Mass is a passionate and collective commitment to this worldview.
3.4 Counterparts 
Now that we have lined up all of the trademark features of the language of the 
Liturgy, and discussed how some of the central components of the Christian 
worldview are established in Mass, we may now turn around, as it were, to see 
where the Liturgy and everyday conversation overlap. What can the Liturgy tell 
us about language use external to it? Are there any counterparts of the linguistic 
mechanisms in Mass to be found in naturally occurring conversation? Which 
other activity types resemble Mass most closely?
To start with the last question, the scripted and formal rigidity of Mass in 
general can be found in many other social activities as well, such as marriage 
ceremonies, council meetings, theatre, sport contests and festivals (Rappaport 
1995, Searle 1995, Clark 1996). Also, each of these examples is a highly 
cooperative enterprise that constitutes social reality in much the same way as 
Mass does. Even in a football game, for example, the team players do not PC-
cooperate, but they do collectively and cooperatively submit to the rules of the 
game, thereby establishing its reality. Furthermore, football games involve, on the 
part of the supporters, collective singing and reciting etc., which functions as the 
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reconfirmation of mutual commitment to the teams. If we zoom out here and think 
of how national anthems, motto’s and languages in general contribute to the self-
image of a nation, we see how Mass really has the same inwardly binding and 
outwardly dividing construction that other elemental forms of social reality have 
(Searle 1995).
We can draw an even more accurate analogy. What Mass is, basically, is 
people gathering to interact directly with an absent addressee in a reconciling 
manner. Therefore, the one naturally occurring activity that would resemble Mass 
most strongly would be when a group of people come together to apologize to an 
absent person, asking him/her to forgive them, offering gifts and honouring 
him/her in the process. As such, Mass seems intimately related to funerals, 
cremations, burials and other sorts of death processions. One crucial difference is 
precisely the emphasis on the culpability of the community in Mass. The main 
goal of Mass, the salvation of all members of the community through divine 
mercy (i.e. the elimination of their culpability), is what sets it apart from other 
activity types. If we look for a one-on-one counterpart of Mass in naturally 
occurring conversation, we are left empty-handed, because there are no 
spontaneous activities where people collectively try to achieve salvation. 
However, if we subtly manipulate some of the features of Mass, we do find an 
equivalent in everyday interaction. A helpful trick here is to imagine that the 
absent addressee actually is present, and that the congregation is not a 
congregation but a single person. That is, if we imagine a situation where one 
person asks another person to forgive him/her in a face-to-face conversation, that 
would simply be what happens whenever two people are trying to restore 
harmony and come to terms with each other. Consider the following fictional 
dialogue:
(10) A: I’m so sorry, I’m such an idiot. I wish I had said no!
     I’m begging you, please forgive me.
B: Promise me that you will never do it again.
A: I can’t do that. You know how it is.
B: Say it! Tell me that you promise!
A: Ok, I promise. I swear I won’t ever do it again.
B: Good, we’re okay. I forgive you. 
A: Thank you so much. You’re such an angel. I love you.
B: Yeah, whatever. I hope you’ve finally learned from your 
     mistakes.
We notice that, like in Mass, the language in this dialogue functions primarily in 
the intersubjective dimension, at the interpersonal level between speaker and 
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Table 9: Parallel speech acts in ordinary conversation and Mass 
hearer. Furthermore, with regards to speech acts, we find some direct parallels in 
the Liturgy, in some cases even with respect to semantic content:
In the introduction, I stated that faith in God is not very different from faith in 
other people. The point of this paper has been all along not that we interact with 
God like we do with humans, but that we interact with God in a specific way, 
which brings to light merely one specific aspect of our everyday interaction with 
humans. I have dubbed this the ethical aspect of interpersonal communication: 
apologizing, confessing, admitting, begging, commanding, praising, thanking; 
cooperating in trying to get in agreement; directly assessing and (re-)establishing 
our interpersonal relations – these are the things we do when we try to solve a 
conflict and reconcile with each other as human beings, and we do the same 
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things when we interact with the divine. Faith in God, therefore, is not like faith in 
other people’s existence, but in their power to be compassionate and forgiving. 
Another striking observation can be made from table 9. Allowing our 
observations to work both ways, we could say that if the middle column is the 
language of a ritual, and the right column shows that the middle and left columns 
overlap, then the dialogue in the left column is a ‘little ritual’ as well. This need 
not surprise us, because in fact, as became clear from the first chapter, language is 
inherently a ritualistic procedure. Whenever we talk, we adhere to principles, 
maxims, rules, regulations, and structured patterns, much like we do in Mass. 
Language really is a ritual, one that factually constructs social reality, in that it 
creates in-groups of speakers with their own conventionalized system of 
communication. 
Once again, the crucial difference is not that Mass is a scripted ritual, but that 
it is a completely scripted ritual. We saw in table 8 that it involves no strategic, 
uncooperative use of language, no uncertainty about the upcoming course of the 
event, and no changes of meaning, whereas these features are intrinsic to naturally 
occurring conversation, no matter how conventionalized it is. Put simply, Mass 
can be seen as an ordinary dialogue, involving such basic acts as apologizing, 
confessing, forgiving and reconciling, which directly affect the interpersonal 
relationships of those involved. However, the liturgical dialogue is extraordinary 
in that it takes place within a completely institutionalized context, omitting all 
uncooperative intentions and possible confusion among participants. As such, the 
Liturgy is a maximally ritualized dialogue of reconciliation – a passionate 
conversation that once may have suffered from confusion and uncertainties, but 
which has solidified more and more over time, until it was ‘carved in stone’ and 
became a ceremony. 
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Conclusion
In the Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, Wittgenstein compares religious 
rituals to ‘kissing the picture of one’s beloved’. Such an act is not based on an 
epistemological belief that it will have any real effect on the world, but is really an 
expression of a certain wish or desire, in that ‘we just behave this way and then 
we feel satisfied’ (1993: 123). I have shown that the participants in Mass too are 
ultimately not trying to exercise an influence on the world, but on themselves. 
Their belief in and interaction with God is a means to a goal – the goal being the 
relief of forgiveness. Similarly, our talk concerning our relationships with each 
other has as its purpose to effect those relations directly, and to establish a state of 
agreement. What believers do in Mass, therefore, is much like what we do when 
we talk to other people about our relationships with them. 
We may wonder with Kellenberger how soon we would have gained these 
insights ‘if we started with the question “What evidence is there for God’s 
existence?” or the question “Is belief in God’s existence properly basic?”’ (1990: 
162). Scientists such as Dennett, Dawkins or Hitchens, however, do depart from 
such questions, and try to prove that there is no evidence for God’s existence, and 
that belief in God is an epistemic error. As such, they are blind to the fact that 
‘historical proof (…) is irrelevant to belief. This message (The Gospels) is seized 
on by men believingly (i.e. lovingly). That is the certainty characterizing this 
particular acceptance-as-true, not something else’ (Wittgenstein 1984: 32). Even 
if tomorrow Dawkins would prove that Christ was not resurrected and that the 
existence of God is impossible, this would not at all touch the fundamental 
propositions of Christianity. To ask ‘Does God exist?’ is, in a way, as pointless as 
asking ‘Does my neighbour exist?’ What is important is how we relate to God and 
our fellow humans, because once we have encountered them, our relationships 
with both are real beyond doubt – perhaps even for atheists and solipsists.
Just like our language in general, our rituals get their meaning ‘from the rest 
of our activities’ – from the ‘form of our lives’. The dogmas of Christianity, re-
enacted and reconfirmed in the ritual of Mass, relate intimately to the ethical 
dimension of human life. With that conclusion before us, I will bring this paper to 
a close by citing Wittgenstein once more:
‘Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the 
ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be 
no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But 
it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally 
cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it.’ 
(1993: 44)
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iAppendix: The Liturgy of the Roman Catholic Mass
(I) Introit
(1) Priest: In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy 
Spirit.
(2) People: Amen.
(3) Priest: The Lord be with you, and with your spirit. 
(4) Brethren, let us acknowledge our sins, and so prepare 
ourselves to celebrate the sacred mysteries.
(5) All: I confess to almighty God and to you, my brothers and 
sisters, that I have greatly sinned in my thoughts and in my 
words, in what I have done and in what I have failed to do;
through my fault, through my fault, through my most 
grievous fault; 
(6) therefore I ask blessed Mary ever-Virgin, all the Angels and 
Saints, and you, my brothers and sisters, to pray for me to 
the Lord our God.
(7) Priest: May almighty God have mercy on us, forgive us our sins, 
and bring us to eternal life.
(8) People: Amen.
(II) Kyrie
(9) All: Lord, have mercy.
(10) Christ, have mercy.
(III) Gloria
(11) All: Glory to God in the highest, 
(12) and on earth peace to people of good will. 
(13) We praise you, 
(14) we bless you, 
(15) we adore you, 
(16) we glorify you,
(17) we give you thanks for your great glory, Lord God, 
heavenly King, O God, almighty Father. 
(18) Lord Jesus Christ, Only Begotten Son, Lamb of God, Son of 
the Father, you take away the sins of the world
(19) have mercy on us; 
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(20) you take away the sins of the world, 
(21) receive our prayer; 
(22) you are seated at the right hand of the Father, 
(23) have mercy on us. 
(24) For you alone are the Holy One, 
(25) you alone are the Lord, 
(26) you alone are the Most High, Jesus Christ, with the Holy 
Spirit, in the glory of God the Father. 
(27) Amen.
(IV) Gradual
(28) Reader: The Word of the Lord.
(29) All: Thanks be to God.
(30) Deacon: Your blessing, Father.
(31) Priest: May the Lord be in your heart and on your lips 
(32) that you may proclaim his Gospel worthily and well, in the 
name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.
(33) Deacon: Amen.
(34) Cleanse my heart and my lips, almighty God,
(35) that I may worthily proclaim your holy Gospel.
(36) The Lord be with you,
(37) People and with your spirit.
(38) Deacon: A reading from the Holy Gospel according to N.
(39) People: Glory to you, O Lord.
(40) Deacon: The Gospel of the Lord.
(41) People: Praise to you, Lord Jesus Christ.
(42) Deacon: Through the words of the Gospel may our sins be wiped 
away.
(V) Credo
(43) All: I believe in one God, the Father almighty, maker of heaven 
and earth, of all things visible and invisible. 
(44) And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Only Begotten Son of 
God, born of the Father before all ages.
(45) God from God, 
(46) Light from Light, 
(47) true God from true God, 
(48) begotten, not made, 
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(49) consubstantial with the Father;
(50) through him all things were made.
(51) For us men and for our salvation he came down from 
heaven, 
(52) and by the Holy Spirit was incarnate of the Virgin Mary,
(53) and became man. 
(54) For our sake he was crucified under Pontius Pilate, 
(55) he suffered death and was buried, 
(56) and rose again on the third day in accordance with the 
Scriptures. 
(57) He ascended into heaven 
(58) and is seated at the right hand of the Father. 
(59) He will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead
(60) and his kingdom will have no end.
(61) And in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the giver of life, 
(62) who proceeds from the Father and the Son, 
(63) who with the Father and the Son is adored and glorified,
(64) who has spoken through the prophets.
(65) And one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church. 
(66) I confess one baptism for the forgiveness of sins,
(67) and I look forward to the resurrection of the dead and the 
life of the world to come.
(68) Amen.
(VI) Offertorium
(69) Priest: Blessed are you, Lord God of all creation,
(70) for through your goodness we have received the bread we 
offer you: fruit of the earth and work of human hands, 
(71) it will becomes for us the bread of life.
(72) People: Blessed be God forever!
(73) Priest: By the mystery of this water and wine may we come to 
share in the divinity of Christ, 
(74) who humbled himself to share in our humanity.
(75) Blessed are you, Lord God of all creation, 
(76) for through your goodness we have received the wine we 
offer you: fruit of the vine and work of human hands, 
(77) it will become our spiritual drink
(78) People: Blessed be God forever!
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(79) Priest: With humble spirit and contrite heart may we be accepted 
by you, O Lord, 
(80) and may our sacrifice in your sight this day be pleasing to 
you, Lord God.
(81) Wash me, O Lord, from my iniquity and cleanse me from 
my sin.
(82) Pray, brethren, that my sacrifice and yours 
(83) may be acceptable to God, the almighty Father.
(84) People: May the Lord accept the sacrifice at your hands for the 
praise and glory of his name, for our good and the good of 
all his holy Church.
(VII) Sanctus
(85) All: Holy, holy, holy Lord of Hosts, heaven and earth are full of 
your glory.
(86) Hosanna in the highest.
(87) Blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord.
(88) Hosanna in the highest.
(VIII) Eucharist
(89) Priest: To you, therefore, most merciful Father, we make humble 
prayer and petition through Jesus Christ, your Son, our 
Lord:
(90) accept and bless these gifts, these offerings, these holy and 
unblemished sacrifices, which we offer you first of all for 
your holy Catholic Church.
(91) Be pleased to grant her peace, to guard, unite and govern 
her throughout the whole world (…) in communion with 
those whose memory we venerate (…):
(92) through their merits and prayers, grant that in all things 
we may be defended by your protecting help.
(93) Therefore, Lord, we pray:
(94) graciously accept this oblation of our service, that of your 
whole family;
(95) order our days in your peace,
(96) and command that we be delivered from eternal damnation 
and counted among the flock of those you have chosen.
(97) We pray, O God, 
v(98) be pleased, to bless, acknowledge, and approve this offering 
in every respect; 
(99) make it spiritual and acceptable, 
(100) so that it may become for us the Body and Blood of your 
most beloved Son, our Lord Jesus Christ.
(101) On the day before he was to suffer he took bread in his holy 
and venerable hands, 
(102) and with eyes raised to heaven to you, O God, his almighty 
Father, giving you thanks, he said the blessing, broke the 
bread and gave it to his disciples, saying: Take this, all of 
you, and eat of it, for this is my body, which will be given 
up for you.
(103) In a similar way, when supper was ended, he took his 
precious chalice in his holy and venerable hands, and once 
more giving you thanks, he said the blessing and gave the 
chalice to his disciples, saying: Take this, all of you, and 
drink from it, for this is the chalice of my blood, the blood 
of the new and eternal covenant, which will be poured out 
for you and for many for the forgiveness of sins. Do this in 
memory of me. (…)
(104) People: The mystery of faith.
(105) We, your servants and your holy people, offer to your 
glorious majesty from the gifts that you have given us, this 
pure victim, this holy victim, this spotless victim, the holy 
Bread of eternal life and the Chalice of everlasting 
salvation. (…)
(106) In humble prayer we ask you, almighty God: 
(107) command that these gifts be borne by the hands of your 
holy Angel to your altar on high in the sight of your divine 
majesty,
(108) so that all of us who through this participation at the altar 
receive the most holy Body and Blood of your Son may be 
filled with every grace and heavenly blessing, through 
Christ our Lord.
(109) Amen. (…)
(110) The peace of the Lord be with you always
(111) People: and with your spirit.
(112) Priest: Let us offer each other the sign of peace.
(113) May this mingling of the Body and Blood of our Lord Jesus 
Christ bring eternal life to us who receive it.
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(IX) Agnus Dei
(114) All: Lamb of God, you who take away the sins of the world, 
have mercy on us,
(115) grant us peace.
(X) Communion
(116) Priest: Lord Jesus Christ, Son of the living God, who by the will of 
the Father and the work of the Holy Spirit, through your 
death gave life to the world;
(117) Free me by this your most holy Body and Blood from all 
my sins and from every evil;
(118) keep me always faithful to your commandments,
(119) and never let me be parted from you.
(120) Behold the Lamb of God, 
(121) behold him who takes away the sins of the world.
(122) Blessed are those called to the supper of the Lamb.
(123) All: Lord, I am not worthy that you should enter under my roof,
(124) but only say the word and my soul shall be healed.
(125) Priest: May the Body of Christ keep me safe for eternal life.
(126) May the Blood of Christ keep me safe for eternal life.
(127) The Body of Christ.
(128) People: Amen.
(129) Priest: What has passed our lips as food, O Lord, may we possess 
in purity of heart, 
(130) that what has been given to us in time may be our healing 
for eternity.
(XI) Ite, missa est
(131) Priest: May almighty God bless you; the Father, the Son and the 
Holy Spirit.
(132) People: Amen.
(133) Priest: Go forth, 
(134) the Mass is ended.
(135) People: Thanks be to God.

